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“Democracy Inaction?”
How “Fake-News” is Defining American Citizenship
This study examines the sociological implications of contemporary news-style political
satire on the American public. Comedic programs such as The Daily Show, The Colbert Report
and The Onion have exploded in popularity in recent years, and have become a fairly influential
part of the mainstream media’s field of political discourse. These media texts stand next to, and
in continual conversation with, the traditional newspapers and television broadcasts which they
parody, revealing some of the hypocrisies and absurdities in government and media. The rise of
this genre has accompanied a shift in public ideology, toward anti-authoritarian and antiintellectual sentiments. In the past several decades, there has been a well-documented decrease
in public trust in government and journalism, and the perceived relationship between individuals
and institutions has been altered. The purpose of this study is to determine how political satirists
define citizenship, and to examine the effect of political satire on viewers’ conceptualizations of
citizenship. Does satire create a cynical and disaffected populous, or does it encourage critical
debate and proactive political attitudes and behaviors? The original research conducted in this
study consists of content analysis of satirical videos and survey data gathered from a national
population.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“The image of Americans that is reflected back to us by our political and
media process is false… If the picture of us were true, our inability to solve
problems would actually be quite sane and reasonable. Why would you work
with Marxists actively subverting our Constitution or racists and homophobes
who see no one’s humanity but their own? We hear every damn day about
how fragile our country is -- on the brink of catastrophe -- torn by polarizing
hate and how it’s a shame that we can’t work together to get things done, but
the truth is we do. We work together to get things done every damn day.”
- Jon Stewart (2010a.)

On October 30, 2010, comedian and host of The Daily Show Jon Stewart gave the
above speech to an estimated 215,000 people gathered on the National Mall in Washington,
D.C. at the culmination of the “Rally To Restore Sanity and/or Fear.” The event, which he
had organized with fellow television satirist Stephen Colbert, was both a demonstration of
dissent and the development of a productive venue that would allow ordinary Americans to
engage in political discourse separate from the partisan extremists that populate the news
media. He would later say about the speech, “We’d done twelve years of the show. I’d
earned ten minutes of just rank sincerity and it felt like a great privilege to stand there
amongst people who worked hard to get there, and have them listen to you tell them what
you feel like…your work is about” (Stewart 2010b.) As a news parodist and political
satirist, Stewart stated that he believes his work is about humorously articulating the
critiques many Americans have about their political and social circumstances. The primary
target of his scathing mockery in recent years has been what he calls “the country's 24 -hour
politico pundit panic conflict-onator,” referring to the new political-media landscape that
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feeds off of partisan conflict in Washington and “amplifies a division that I don’t actually
think is there at all” (Stewart 2010b).
If Stewart is correct in his belief that the political media in this country is reflecting a
distorted version of American politics, such a condition has huge implications for how
citizens grow to understand the structural organization of their society. In particular, if the
new media landscape gives partisan extremists the platforms to shut down democratic
debate as they strategically vie for positions of power, the many moderate voices of the
national majority are effectively excluded. With a democratic system of governance that
was founded on the principle of every citizen possessing the power to influence the
direction of their government, the abstraction of the individual from political processes
poses a threat to its very legitimation.
Given that citizens in a democracy are partially reliant on the news media for the
information necessary to make informed political decisions and take appropriate political
action, it is important to recognize when media-industry motivations may have a corrupting
influence on ordinary citizens. Such has been Jon Stewart’s task during the past 14 years as
host of a half-hour nightly comedy show, in which he parodies a cable news program in
order to spotlight the ways in which that type of media might be misleading viewers. In a
similar fashion, Stephen Colbert (host of The Colbert Report) and satirical news
organization The Onion walk the hyperreal line between comedy and news, and point out
the potentially destructive absurdities and hypocrisies abound in national politics and media.
By standing up against the forces that threaten the health of American democracy, Stewart
and his colleagues serve an important function in defining the relationships between the
government, media, and the citizenry.
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Political satire has existed nearly as long as humans have begun organizing
themselves with some system of governance, and there is evidence dating back to ancient
democratic Athens that satire has historically influenced public opinion (Rosen 2012). In
many societies since, satire has played a role in shaping how average citizens conceived of
their social status in relation to that government. As satire has evolved in its form, from
poems and epigrams to political cartoons to the modern news parody, so has the genre’s
context and ultimate task been changed.
The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and The Onion, to name three of the most
popular examples of contemporary political satire franchises that will serve as th e focus of
this study, perform their task through expert parody of print, broadcast, and cable news
media. Sociologists have long studied the socializing role of mass media, trying to discover
how media texts actively and uniformly shape the worldview of a large community in order
to coordinate social action. The political press, in particular, gives citizens access to
political information that is critical for building their understanding of government functions
and current happenings outside of their direct experience. The news serves such vital
functions for American political society, and therefore, it is also important for sociologists
to take a closer look at media texts that offer alternative understandings of our world
through their critique of traditional media.
The United States is a nation comprised of 300 million people, who come from
incredibly diverse backgrounds and have quite different lived experiences. Yet, we all call
ourselves American citizens, and live under the same rule of law and same general moral
principles that allow us to coordinate our numerous and diverse actions into a complex but
highly-organized society. At the top of this organizational structure is the federal
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government. In order for this system of legislators, administrators, and arbitrators to be able
to direct the human action of 300 million people, it must be seen as a legitimate form of
social control by those people. The philosophy behind the United States’ representational
democracy posits that citizens are able to influence public policy according to their needs
through the people they elect into office. How can the multiple and diverse interests of
millions of people be effectively negotiated in this system? How do political communities
work when social ties become increasingly fragmented? Why do modern Americans remain
loyal to a legal system that facilitates social control, when we are acutely aware of
conditions of political corruption and structural inequalities that give certain groups of
people unequal access to power?
This study attempts to answer some of these questions regarding weakening social
cohesion and the growing crisis of legitimation in relationship to political satire. What does
this genre of media do for American citizens who are growing disillusioned with their
government and less trusting of their information sources? Does the act of pointing out the
flaws and hypocrisies in our organizing institutions threaten their authority, or does it make
them more relevant to the lives of individuals? Is a critical, cynical mode of political
discourse harmful or healthy for democratic society? Chapter two contextualizes these
questions through a discussion of some of the existing literature on political satire and its
effects. In chapter three, I use the theories of Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Jürgen
Habermas to provide a sociological foundation for my research questions and to construct
ideal definitions of citizenship that are utilized throughout the study. Chapter four explains
the conceptualization and operationalization processes of the study’s methodological
development, and details how both qualitative and quantitative data was gathered. The
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study’s results are presented in chapter five, and chapter six contains a discussion of the
results. Chapter seven concludes the thesis, contributing new insights regarding the social
function of political comedy in American society.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION
The academic literature on The Daily Show and similar forms of political comedy has
grown exponentially in recent years, in large part due to their increasing significance within
popular culture and a growing recognition of their potential to impact the nation’s political
processes in a variety of ways. Through a review of recent studies that have explained the trend,
I will show that the popularity of political comedy in the form of journalistic parody provides the
basis for an important sociological study which asks how definitions of citizenship in the postmodern society are influenced by the genre, and how this in turn impacts political-social
behaviors.
Political satire is a significant phenomenon, in part due to the size of its viewership,
particularly in comparison to traditional news sources. A 2007 national survey reported that 16
percent of Americans were regular viewers of The Daily Show or its spin-off The Colbert Report,
ratings that rival major news programs such as Fox News’ The O’Reilly Factor (watched
regularly by 17 percent of the nation), and NewsHour with Jim Lehrer on PBS (14 percent) (Pew
Research Center for the People and the Press 2007b). More generally, the public’s news
consumption patterns are shifting. In the lead-up to the 2012 presidential election, another study
conducted in January 2012(a) by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found a
broad drop in the numbers of Americans getting campaign news from traditional sources, such as
newspapers, local and network TV news. Only 20 percent of respondents reported that they
regularly learn something about the election from newspapers (compared with 31 percent in
2008 and 40 percent in 2000). Late night comedy shows, on the other hand, have risen as a
regular news source for the general public, cited by nine percent of respondents (up from six
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percent in 2000), and as many as 15 percent of young people ages 18-29. The study notes that it
is “the only campaign news source tested that young people turn to more than older people”
(p.10).
Parallel to the shift in news consumption patterns, there has been a change in the public’s
opinion of its news sources. Generally, negative opinions of the press’ performance are on the
rise, with a strong majority of people believing news stories are inaccurate, biased, or influenced
by powerful people and organizations (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2011).
Remarkably, in such a critically cynical environment, comedian Jon Stewart was ranked fourth
on the list of America’s most admired journalists, tied with anchormen Brian Williams, Tom
Brokaw, Dan Rather, and cable news host Anderson Cooper (Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press 2007a). Stewart has repeatedly rejected the notion that people consider his
show anything more than a satirical comedy show, and is often quoted as saying things such as,
“We feel no obligation to follow the news cycle. In other words, I felt no obligation to cover [a
particular] story in any way, because… we're not journalists” (Stewart 2007).
The tension between the stated intention of political comedy from its creators
(entertainment) and the perceptions of the general public (information source) are not easily
ignored. The topic has received attention from media scholars, psychologists and political
scientists who seek to figure out the real impact of parody on public opinion and civic behavior.
This literature review will first discuss the role of traditional journalism in constructing political
knowledge, suggesting that the mainstream press has contributed to anti-authoritarian and antiintellectual public attitudes which have in turn negatively affected levels of trust in the news. I
will then outline the rise of satirical news outlets in recent decades in response to the declining
trust in reporting, and problematize the labels of “real” vs. “fake” news, in part through a
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comparison of content. I will then discuss the rhetorical aspects of journalistic satire, drawing on
Bakhtinian models of parodic discourse, and suggesting the genre serves a critical function for
democratic societies. Finally, I will detail a few of the recent experimental studies that attempt
to uncover the impacts of modern political satire on levels of institutional trust, political learning,
political participation, and levels of cynicism.

CONTEMPORARY JOURNALISM AND CYNICISM
Sociologists and media critics have long debunked the myth that journalism is an
objective or neutral endeavor that presents an accurate portrayal of a social reality. The press is
inescapably ideological in nature, with the selection and presentation of new stories conforming
to established societal and journalistic values, and furthermore, driven by profit interests
(Croteau, Hoynes, and Milan 2011). Nonetheless, U.S. citizens depend on the news to receive
information about political matters—a realm that many people do not often come in contact with
directly. The American representative system of governance puts policy decisions in the hands
of a small pool of elected and appointed political elites, locating government happenings far
outside of our direct experience. Richard Davis has suggested that political socialization, “the
process by which people from childhood on develop cognitions, attitudes, and behavioral
patterns about politics,” is achieved in significant part through the agent of mass media
(1992:241). He points to a growing body of research that confirms media’s effect on people’s
(particularly young people’s) awareness and knowledge of politics, as well as their values,
attitudes, and opinions of government institutions. Due to the fact that most Americans rely on
news organizations to inform them of civic matters, journalists hold a significant amount of
influential power over the public, shaping our individual opinions and our social reality
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according to particular narratives. Popular opinion is simultaneously reflected and created in the
press.
Michael Schudson (1999) argues in his essay “Social Origins of Press Cynicism in
Portraying Politics” that, over the past several decades, the press and traditional media have
been fostering audience’s negative attitudes towards the government through their own cynical
portrayals. He points to an “anti-politics bias and a corporate tilt toward infotainment” in the
news that shapes a particularly negative worldview (p.998). The causes of this pessimistic
journalism, he believes, stem from factors such as journalists’ declining deference to authority
and increased professionalism, as well as a growing emphasis on thematic coherence within the
industry. In the wake of government and media scandals during the Vietnam War and Nixon
administration, reporters and editors have earned an increased authority relative to their sources,
and have grown more analytical and self-conscious in their political coverage. At the same time,
there has been pressure to thematize and package television news within a coherent narrative
frame for cultural, political, and commercial reasons. Thus, the changing norms of journalistic
behavior having an impact on how political news is presented to the public, which unsurprisingly
contributes to a lowered level of institutional trust for those who consume it.
In his assessment of the current state of American journalism, Schudson says that the
press historically has had populist and anti-intellectual tendencies, and dedicated itself to “the
political enlightenment of its citizens” using appeals to the amateur rather than the expert
(p.999). Contemporary debates about the supposed failings of the news media are focused on
this role of the press to educate the electorate and develop “good” (well-informed) citizens. The
primary academic criticisms, he points out, are that political reporting “is increasingly organized
by presumptions that stem from cynicism in the press corps and promote cynicism in the
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audience,” and “that news institutions increasingly blur news and entertainment, even fact and
fiction” (p.999).
A similar critique of the press by Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson entitled
Spiral of Cynicism (1997) points out that today’s press coverage of political elections centers
around a narrative of strategy. Election stories use the language of war and competition to create
winners and losers, emphasize the performances of the candidates staged for critics and
audiences (pundits and voters), and put heavy weight on polls as a measure of who is ahead or
behind in the horse race, as opposed to discussion of issues and policies. The authors go on to
experiment with news framing and opinion, suggesting that audience cynicism is “activated” by
such narratives of strategy and conflict (p.159), while stories that highlight social issues and
public policies may also induce cynicism in a frustrated audience who do not believe political
actors can reasonably resolve a debate. Thus, the role of the press to inform the democratic
electorate is colored by media narratives that are populist in basic nature, portraying political
elites as perpetually conflictual and as the source of many of the nation’s social problems.
Popular cynicism, however, is not limited to opinions of the government. Somewhat
ironically, the news media is becoming less respected as an institution on which we rely for
political information. Dependency on the news media entails some level of trust—we want to
believe that our primary source of knowledge about the world is measurably accurate and fair.
However, public opinion of news organizations has been growing increasingly negative, at least
over the past several decades since the Pew Research Center began surveying evaluations of
press performance. In 1985, 34 percent of Americans said that news organizations present
inaccurate facts, 53 percent believed that news organizations were often influenced powerful
people and organizations, and 53 percent thought they tended to favor one side. By 2011, those
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numbers have jumped markedly: 66 percent thought news stories were often inaccurate, 80
percent thought they were influenced by powerful figures, and 77 percent saw bias in the
reporting (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2011). In this context, Jon Stewart
has lamented his status as a respected journalist, saying “The embarrassment is that I am given
credibility in this world because of the disappointment that the public has in what the news
media does” (Stewart 2011). The press is directing cynicism toward the government and
producing consumer distrust in its own product, turning people towards alternative sources of
political information.

THE RISE OF FAKE NEWS
As respect for broadcast journalism has declined over the past several decades, so has
America witnessed a rise in the popularity of journalistic parody. As a genre, fake news
programs are adept at pointing out the problems and absurdities of our political system, while
simultaneously lampooning the ways in which political information is presented in the media.
This next section will take a look at the evolution of the genre in the United States, and how it
compares to its predecessor, the “real” news.
Considered the pioneer in mainstream satirical humor was Mad Magazine, a comic-based
publication that began in 1952 and parodied a variety of cultural topics. It was not until 1975
that televised news parody appeared in the United States with the 1975 premiere of Saturday
Night Live’s mock newscast segment “Weekend Update.” In this bit, fake anchor Chevy Chase
would sit behind a news desk, presenting some of the week’s news headlines followed by a
mocking one-liner joke. It was followed by a short-lived HBO series called Not Necessarily the
News from 1983-1990, which often edited or overdubbed actual news footage for comedic effect.
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Perhaps the most successful news parody franchise, The Onion, began as a locally-distributed
satirical newspaper in 1988 in Madison, Wisconsin, and gained national attention with the launch
of its website in 1996. The company was purchased by Comedy Central in 2000, enabling them
to increase their scope, production quality, and audience. Their series of online sketch videos
under the title The Onion News Network launched in 2007, and has enjoyed international
popularity. The Daily Show hosted by Craig Kilborn premiered on Comedy Central in 1996, and
was originally a late-night fake newscast featuring a comedic monologue of the day’s headlines,
in addition to segments satirizing on-location reports and debates from regular correspondents. It
lampooned the superficiality of local news figures, and rarely ventured into the realm of national
or international topics. What the show did, much like “Weekend Update,” was use the news
format as a vehicle for joke-telling (Tally 2011). When comedian Jon Stewart took over the
program in 1999, he made the decision to redirect the show’s focus from pop culture and
entertainment content toward topics of politics and news media. Perhaps the most insightful and
influential satirical program, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart developed a highly critical
editorial voice during the 2000 presidential election, which it covered under the mocking title
“Indecision 2000.” The show produced a spin-off starting in 2005 with former Daily Show
correspondent Stephen Colbert stepping into the fictional character of a right-wing cable news
pundit in The Colbert Report.
Since then, the comedic duo of Stewart and Colbert has exploded in popularity, and has
become a pop culture institution that, ironically, holds quite a bit of political clout. High-status
politicians, foreign ambassadors, and political activists often come on the shows to be
interviewed by the comedians, while both Stewart and Colbert have been active outside of their
programs in matters of politics and media. Most famously, Stewart has been credited with
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putting an end to CNN’s political debate show Crossfire after appearing on the program in 2004
and soberly accusing hosts Tucker Carlson and Paul Begala of being “partisan hacks” whose
absurd, hate-fueled political theater was “hurting America” (Stewart 2004a). On October 30,
2010, Stewart and Colbert hosted a political rally on Washington, D.C.’s National Mall called
“Rally to Restore Sanity and/or Fear,” whose purpose was to promote reasoned public discussion
against the polarized extremists that “control the conversation” of United States politics by
demonizing those on the opposite side of the partisan spectrum.
In his discussion of the potential impact of today’s political satire on national culture,
Geoffrey Baym (2006) situates The Daily Show at the crossroads of news, entertainment, public
affairs, and pop culture, which are increasingly converging, and in his opinion, degrading the
quality of broadcast journalism. He writes that, “The once-authoritative nightly news has been
fractured, replaced by a variety of programming strategies ranging from the latest version of
network ‘news lite’ to local news happy talk and 24-hour cable news punditry” (p.259). As a
result, “some of the principles of good journalism—independence, inquiry, and verification—are
often sacrificed to meet the demand for eye-catching content…to complicate the matter, the
public appears to be growing dissatisfied with its broadcast news alternatives” (pp.259-260).
Thus “fake news” in the style of Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert occupies an almost natural
place in the television schedule, looking like a combination of traditional newscast and cable
news punditry, yet never claiming to be unbiased, inquisitive, or factual.
Citing statistics that 21 percent of people ages 18-29 claim to regularly learn about news
and politics from political comedy shows (an demographic that is an estimated 40% of The Daily
Show’s audience), Baym notes that “the show is playing in the domain of serious political
communication,” particularly when it serves as a forum for politicians who are guests on the
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show (p.260). He emphasizes the program’s importance in relation to traditional media by
arguing:
The label of ‘fake news’ also has a deeper problem. Any notion of ‘fake’ depends upon
an equal conception of ‘real.’ Fake news necessitates assumptions about some kind of
authentic or legitimate set of news practices, ideals that one rarely hears articulates or
necessarily sees as evident today… [N]ews…is defined and constrained by a set of
cultural practices, informal and often implicit agreements about proper conduct, style,
and form that are in flux, increasingly multiple, debatable, and open for reconsideration.
(Baym 2006:261)

In the context of an evolving media environment, where media outlets are multiplying in number
but consolidating ownership and integrating with other social structures, Baym conceives of The
Daily Show as an “experiment in journalism” growing from the innovative phenomenon of
discursive integration, which aims to revive a journalism of critical inquiry and advance a model
of deliberative democracy. While Stewart and Colbert insist that they have no such
agenda1,Baym insists that the show should not be understood as “fake news,” but “as an
alternative journalism, one that uses satire to interrogate power, parody to critique contemporary
news, and dialogue to enact a model of deliberative democracy” (p.261).
At a period in which journalistic conventions are in flux, the fake news programs, from
which viewers glean significant amounts of information alongside comedy, are offering their
interpretation of what real news should strive for: challenging the legitimacy and authority of our
leaders while searching for truth through inquiry. McBeth and Clemons (2011) argue that the
fake news is the real news, because it has the impact that traditional journalism “should” have—

1

Excerpt from Jon Stewart interview with Fox News Sunday’s Chris Wallace, June 2011:
WALLACE: I think your agenda is more out there, and you're pushing more of an agenda than you pretend to.
STEWART: I disagree with you. I think that I'm pushing comedy and my ideological agenda informs it, at all times.
Now, that agenda or my ideology is at times liberal, at times can lean more conservative, but it's about absurdity. It's
about absurdity and it's about corruption. And that is the agenda that we push. It is an anti-corruption, anti-lack of
authenticity, anti-contrivance, and if I see that more in one area than I do in another, well then I will defend every
single thing that we put on that show. And I'm not dodging you in any way by suggesting that our main thrust is
comedy (Stewart 2011).
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strengthening democracy, informing policy debate, creating a discourse that engages alternative
views, and ultimately impacting public opinion to encourage political participation. They argue
that “much of American political coverage is inauthentic (fake) and that the programs of Jon
Stewart and Stephen Colbert both represent authentic (real) discourse that breaks through the
shell of the real (fake) news revealing layers of social construction, empty symbolism, and
simulacra—thus positively affecting the traditional coverage and political discourse” (p.81). In a
sense, applications of the definitions of “real” and “fake” are not determined by the author of the
content, but by the reader; whatever mediated information is shaping the public’s political reality
is what is most real.

COMPARING CONTENT: REAL VERSUS FAKE NEWS
While the distinction between “fake” and “real” news appears to be blurring in the minds
of media critics, it is important to identify the differences and similarities between the two in
terms of what kind of information they are providing to their viewers. For this, I will now look
to comparative content analyses that reveal what is actually being discussed in the traditional and
satirical news universes.
The Pew Research Center’s Project for Journalistic Excellence conducted an extensive
survey throughout 2007 (published in 2008) on the content and viewership of The Daily Show,
producing several relevant conclusions. Although the range of topics covered by the program is
more limited than the mainstream news press, the study’s authors point out “striking” similarities
between the content of the two texts. For the year of 2007, the programs shared the same top
two topics, U.S. Foreign Affairs (constituting 17 percent of air time on The Daily Show and 19
percent in the mainstream press), and Politics & Elections (16 percent of The Daily Show’s air
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time versus 12 percent in the mainstream press). However, they diverged slightly in the lesser
categories, with The Daily Show taking greater interest in the government, lifestyle news, the
press and media, and celebrities, while the mainstream news devoted more time to non-U.S.
related foreign affairs, crime, disasters, health, business, and the economy.
Because the show has no journalistic obligation to conform their coverage to the news
cycle, their agenda is much more simply narrowed on those topics that are easily lampooned.
That is perhaps why the top two stories in 2007 combined (the 2008 campaign and the policy
debate about the Iraqi war) commanded a full quarter (26 percent) of The Daily Show’s news
coverage, compared to 18 percent in the mainstream press. The study also points out that some
topics that dominate the mainstream press are simply not mentioned on the comedy program at
all. For example, the show shied away from two major tragedies in 2007: the bridge collapse in
Minneapolis that resulted in the deaths of 13 people, and the shootings at Virginia Tech, about
which Stewart expressed sadness at the beginning of his show, saying, “I have absolutely nothing
to add that is insightful or anything” (qtd. in The Pew Center’s Project for Excellence in
Journalism 2008).
Despite some key differences in content, the Pew study concludes that “The Daily Show
is indeed journalistic. Its topic agenda is highly focused on the public square, on issues of
significance, particularly those focused around Washington. Its agenda is not dissimilar, indeed,
from other cable talk shows. The language is even more blunt, and its point often more direct.
The Daily Show is no doubt entertainment, but it is entertainment, measurably, with a substantive
point” (2008:15).
In another comparison of content between The Daily Show and mainstream newscasts
(ABC’s World News Tonight with Peter Jennings, CBS’s Evening News with Dan Rather, and
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NBC’s The Nightly News with Tom Brokaw), Fox, Koloen, and Sahin (2007) found that they
contained, on average, fairly equal quantities of substantive information about the 2004
presidential conventions and debates. The data for this experiment were analyzed using the
entire program as a unit of analysis, and again using each news story as a unit of analysis (as The
Daily Show’s 30-minute program typically contains a greater proportion of stories about political
affairs than network news), producing the same finding: the substance, categorized as concepts
of campaign issues and candidate qualifications, were quantitatively the same. What differed
between the programs was the quality of information presentation: The Daily Show emphasized
humor (coded as moments of joking and laughter) over substantive content, while the broadcast
network news stories contained more hype (coded as concepts of horse race and hoopla) than
substance. The later finding is not necessarily surprising, given the contemporary media
environment that stresses “infotainment.” It provides more empirical evidence to support the
widely-held belief that traditional journalism is failing in its mission to present objective political
information to the public and cultivate an informed electorate. Meanwhile, the finding about The
Daily Show’s content remains consistent with Stewart and Colbert’s continuously repeated
mission of creating comedy over news.
Regardless of whether we consider these comedy programs to be substantive journalism
or not, the fact remains that they function as a source of entertainment and information for
millions of Americans. Further, they serve as a type of political discourse that critically
examines the increasingly complex relationships between individuals and public institutions.
The following section will examine the rhetoric of political news parody, and begin to question
the nature of citizenship in the postmodern democracy.
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RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL NEWS PARODY
Rhetorical discussions of parody usually center on Russian philosopher Mikhail
Bakhtin’s theoretical models of dialogism and the carnival. In pre-reformation Europe,
“carnival” marked the period of time when social hierarchies and cultural norms were
temporarily suspended, allowing the laity to critique institutionalized power in what Bakhtin
calls “the people’s second life, organized on the basis of laughter” (qtd. in Achter 2008:279). As
a historical predecessor to modern satire, carnival is described by Paul Achter (2008) as “a
prevailing mood or spirit of fun mixed with social criticism, and its self-reflexive, playful
discourse practices mark the enduring value of humor and laughter in the public arena” (p.280).
Closely related to carnival is Bakhtin’s concept of dialogic discourse, which suggests there is a
continuous dialogue between cultural texts, always informing and influencing each other. Zoë
Druick (2009) defines dialogism as “the connection of each utterance to a linguistically mediated
social field,” which, applied to the genre of televised news parody, means that there is a strong
lexical association between satirical texts and institutionalized press (p.300). Further, such
programs ask audiences to reflect on the production aspects of broadcast news, to recognize the
problems with its power to prescribe “official” forms of culture, and potentially question its
authority as the “discourse of the real” (p.301). At the same time, however, the use of
mainstream news conventions reinforces the very discourse which it mocks. Thus, as a form of
discourse, news parody is an example of the temporary reversal of power that characterized the
medieval carnival. Although television shows like The Daily Show and The Colbert Report and
newspapers like The Onion are a form of social critique, they are continually constrained by
power relationships, industry rules and conventions, and texts produced by other actors—the
ones they are mocking.
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Druick concludes her essay by asking if the popularity of parody news shows indicates
the exhaustion of televised broadcast news, or if it is “nothing more than a remnant of a more
powerful popular energy of inversion and dissent?” (p.306). Certainly, popular opposition to
authority has always existed, and satire has for a long time served as a tool for questioning and
challenging the basis of power. Druick believes that, at most, the growth of contemporary news
parody indicates skepticism, particularly among today’s youth, toward the authority of the news
and government.
Conversely, Robert Hariman (2008) argues that political humor is a critical tool for
sustaining a culture of political engagement in a democracy. Parodic forms in particular create
“productive articulation of public identity and agency” through the following rhetorical
operations, based off of Bakhtin’s model: doubling, carnivalesque spectatorship, leveling, and
transforming the world of speech into an agnostic field of proliferating voices (p.253). Comic
doubling, he explains, involves the imitation of a particular format, while injecting ambiguity
into the object and suggesting the capability for it to be something else (or nothing at all). For
example, news parody follows the recognizable form and style of a traditional newscast, but
presents a contradictory reality that destabilizes the relationship between form and content.
Similarly, the targeting of authoritative subjects exposes the “actors behind the masks,”
temporarily inverting power relationships in a carnivalesque manner. Furthermore, Hariman
believes that the elements of silliness and laughter “annihilate” structures of domination, which
has a leveling effect on people’s conceptions of power structures. When authority is exposed as
an image and the scripts of hierarchy are disrupted, resistance becomes a more viable response.
Finally, parody portrays the field of public discourse as a dynamic space where numerous voices
comment and debate on the social world. In summation, Hariman argues that “The long-term
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effect of a public culture alive with parody is an irreverent democratization of the conventions of
public discourse, which in turn keeps speech closer to its audiences and their experience in the
public world” (p.258). Such an effect is critical for a democratic society to function effectively;
it equips citizens to be able “to negotiate plural interests based on realistic accounts of self, other,
and a world of change” (p.259). A public consciousness that contains a good dose of parodic
representations leaves space for bottom-up political and social change. The application of
Bakhtinian frames by Druick and Hariman provide a starting point for understanding how
political parody and notions of citizenship are intimately connected.
In his analysis of 25 political clips from the The Onion’s online video series, The Onion
News Network, Don J. Waisanen (2011) argues that the parodist sketch comedy invites new civic
understandings of media and political institutions through its distinct rhetorical style which he
calls “ironic iconicity.” The Onion’s fake broadcasts, he indicates, are near-perfect replicas of
the real programs in style, structure, and delivery, offering distorted content as the only
difference—and it is in that ironic recognition of the journalistic imitation with exaggerated
content that is the source of humor. This practice diverges from comedy shows like The Daily
Show and Saturday Night Live’s “Weekend Update”, “where social critique is often dampened
by outrageous farcical exaggeration,” where the actors make known to the audience that they are
crafting a joke (p.509). The Onion makes no such obvious indications that it is fake news,
instead delivers the stories with deadpan seriousness and professionally-produced visuals. Thus,
The Onion News Network “walks a hyperreal line,” juxtaposing “veristic and slightly fanaticized
structure, delivery, and content” in a manner that focuses on “the contingency, recursivity, and
ethical judgment of mainstream news broadcasts” (p.509). The effect is that the viewer’s
attention is drawn toward the taken-for-granted conventions of the media. Take, for example,
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the air of certainty imbued in newscasts that masks the fact that they are creating narratives,
editorializing, and relying on other media for their own reports. By twisting news conventions to
deliver bizarre and hyperreal content, The Onion “interrogates the constructedness of fact and
fiction in the news” and questions the legitimacy of the broadcast media’s claim to represent a
factual reality (p.513). Additionally, Waisanen argues that The Onion serves a recursive
function, building off of the rituals and patterns of newsmaking to encourage a creative social
discourse in online forums. However, The Onion’s satirical critique does not leave its notions of
civic duty completely open for interpretation; the franchise delivers a set of stable moral
judgments that are amplified in their hyperreal space. Because the world of The Onion is
remarkably similar to our own, audiences are able to recognize our society’s moral conflicts that
are spotlighted when they are exaggerated in the fake news.
The function of The Onion’s sketch videos, then, is to “craft broader outlooks for
understanding the systemic political issues and social terrain that we all inhabit” (Waisanen
2011:524). Not only does the institution encourage audiences to be more aware of the rhetorical
dynamics at play in the news media, but it asks them to consider the public and political habits
that are harmful to society at large. Waisanen believes that the moral judgments presented in
these hyperreal journalistic spaces offer the public alternative conceptions of reality. In these
depictions of a fatalistic version of our society, there is space left open for improvement.
In a similarly optimistic analysis of the discourse of The Daily Show and The Colbert
Report, Waisanen (2009) identifies three rhetorical strategies of the comedians that he argues are
critically reframing political discourse in America and “creatively guiding audiences toward
democratic possibilities” (p.120). He points out that, while political comedy can often be
divisive or cynical, “Stewart and Colbert ultimately embrace their targets while pointing out their
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potential flaws” and affirm democratic ideals whenever they draw attention to social absurdities
and contradictions (p.121). His empirical study examined 40 clips of political content from each
of the programs, in addition to transcripts from two of the comedians’ more controversial
appearances on other cable news programs (Jon Stewart on CNN”s Crossfire in 2007 and
Stephen Colbert on The O’Reilly Factor in 2007).
Waisanen identifies three common strategies of incongruous-perspective comedy that he
argues advance democratic attitudes in larger society: parodic polyglossia, satirical specificity,
and contextual clash. Polyglossia refers to the way in which Stewart and Colbert push their
perspectives through expanded linguistic capacities–-moving between various political and
cultural personae in a manner that is not seen in the real political or journalistic world. For
example, Stewart most often plays ‘himself,” a concerned, disbelieving citizen, but easily shifts
into character voices to add life and color to his jokes. Colbert’s portrayal of a right-wing pundit
is contrasted by gestures that indicate to the audience that he is in character, and his statements
should not be interpreted literally. The variety of voices they use to present a single story invites
viewers to reflect on the possibility of multiple perspectives (a concept that is notably absent
from most broadcast news presentations). Similarly, like the rhetoric of contingency in The
Onion News Network clips (Waisanen 2011), Stewart and Colbert reveal the constructedness of
their form and style, not-so-subtly hinting at the more covert constructedness of the real news.
Satirical specificity is used by Stewart and Colbert to demystify vague ideologies of the
political world by breaking down grand abstractions (e.g. values like “family,” “equality,” and
“freedom”) and engaging in practical evaluations of specific policy details and political claims.
While the media-viewing public is often comforted by such appeals in political speeches, the
comedians critically appraise the content of their claims rather than their style—and do so with
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frankness and the use of everyday language. The essential function of this, Waisanen argues, is
to “direct critical accountability toward the suasive, mystifying merger in terms of politics and
media” (p.130).
Colbert and Stewart further provide critique of political culture and social situations “by
bringing into conscious view the very constructedness of many social environments” through a
strategy called contextual clash–the mixing of seemingly unrelated contexts (p.130). By
denaturalizing normal situations and naturalizing absurd ones, they point out how media
environments shape our attitudes toward a given situation. Waisanen concludes that these
comical rhetorical strategies practiced daily on these programs do several things to advance
democratic life: encouraging playful (rather than combative) debate that incorporates a variety of
voices; making abstract political matters relevant and engaging to audiences; promoting
reflexivity over faux certitude in media discourse; generating attention toward public matters
using comic frames rather than tragic frames, which encourage rather than shut down debate; and
exposing the patterns of power in political communications. The comical critiques are constantly
“reminding or instructing their audiences about moral and democratic possibilities…to thus deny
that Stewart and Colbert make a positive contribution to democracy would be to deny the very
task of rhetorical study…” (p.134).
Paul Achter (2008) performs a more nuanced analysis of how comedy functions in
moments of national crisis, and consequently sheds light on the relationship between citizens,
news, and news parody. In his article “Comedy in Unfunny Times: News Parody and Carnival
After 9/11,” Achter notes that, following the September 11th terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, many
comedic voices were paralyzed, finding themselves unable (or pressured not) to respond directly
to the tragedy. As the public was faced with fundamental changes in public discourse, so
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emerged the issue of decorum—what constituted an “appropriate” joke was far from clear2.
Achter argues that news parody, The Onion in particular, was particularly well-equipped to
“surmount the rhetorical chill that fell over U.S. public culture” because it exposed contemporary
journalism as an increasingly-prevalent agent of narrative construction (p.267). At the same time
as it challenged the monologism of the news, parody programs created a compelling “second
world” for audiences to contemplate the 9/11 attacks. Achter explains, “Although The Onion
shares with real journalism the goal of producing informed and engaged cultural citizens, it
frames 9/11 and most of its stories as stories about the news, in stark contrast to the seeming
disappearance of the news in its usual rhetorical formulation” (p.286). It thus set up a
carnivalesque perspective that challenged the conceptual frames provided by the mainstream
news—and provided a space for healing separate from serious discourse. Most critically, it
created opportunities for citizens to construct their own meanings of the politically and
emotionally-charged topics, rather than allowing news outlets to frame it for them.
Other researchers on the topic have sought to understand the appeal of the shows’
humorously ironic interpretations of real-world events. Richard Van Heertrum (2011) suggests
that the irony Stewart and Colbert use in crafting their comedy exemplifies the “language of
cool” that is adroitly understood and spoken by younger generations. Irony, defined as the
detachment of figurative and literal meaning, is “a vehicle for critique that protects [individuals]
from the appearance of deeper political engagement” (p.117). The underlying dynamic at work
is “a critique of the current order of things connected to cynicism about the possibility of real
change” (p.117). Such is the political stance that describes many of today’s youth raised on the
tenets of neoliberalism: individualistic, fatalistic, anti-political and anti-intellectual, and defined

2

Interestingly, a panel of comedy writers, editors, and performers convened in New York a month after the attacks
to discuss how to proceed in their jobs, and to explore the paradox of creating comedy in unfunny times.
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by their ability to step outside mainstream culture. However, Van Heertrum does not consider
cynicism an inherently destructive attitude. Instead, he believes it has revolutionary potential—
the satirist opens up space for critique and suggests possibility for social transformation.
However, he lacks vehicles for inciting real social change. Stewart has mirrored this perception
when speaking of his own work, saying, “I can always criticize, but I can’t actually do
anything…The ultimate feeling for me of satire is, it helps deflate something that you might
think is toxic. But it doesn’t help build anything” (Stewart 2010b).
The rhetorical basis of political parody presents somewhat of a paradox. By poking fun
at powerful people and institutions, these programs provide critical examinations of modern
power structures and shed light on the hypocrisies and absurdities that run rampant in our
government and media. Parody, in this case, serves as a watchdog, holding politicians, pundits,
and journalists accountable for their words and actions. Political satirists, particularly Jon
Stewart, have proven to be particularly integral in inspiring both laughter and outrage among the
American public, using comedy combined with factual evidence as their weapons.
On the other hand, by approaching serious topics using heavily ironic humor, political
satire separates itself from the real-world political landscape, and expresses a sharp cynicism that
undermines any possibility of changing the very things it points out to be absurdly problematic.
Thus, it is unclear what messages of citizenship news parody programs are sending to an
audience, or what messages viewers take away from them. Several studies have attempted to
measure the effects of political satire exposure, to see what viewers learn, think about, or do after
consuming this type of media. Some key studies in this field are outlined in the following
section.
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ATTITUDINAL AND BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF VIEWERSHIP
Jody Baumgartner and Jonathan S. Morris (2006) conducted one of the most cited studies
on the topic, entitled “The Daily Show Effect: Candidate Evaluations, Efficacy, and American
Youth,” measuring the attitudinal effects of political comedy on young viewers. In a controlled
experiment using 732 college students, two groups were shown different clips on the topic of the
2004 Presidential candidates and given a posttest questionnaire. The first group saw a
manipulation of coverage from The Daily Show that focused on generating humorous jokes about
both candidates, while the second group watched a “mainstream” news clip from the CBS
Evening News, which presented “serious” television news. The experimenters were careful to
make sure that both clips contained similar content, equalizing as much as possible the amount of
time each one devoted to the “horse race” and “strategy” aspects of the campaign, and to images
and descriptions of each candidate. Due to The Daily Show’s style that mimics a traditional
newscast, the delivery of the messages was similar. Controlling for content and presentation
style, the main difference between the clips was “The Daily Show’s inclusion of sarcasm and
humor” (p.348). A third group did not watch any televised clips, but filled out the same
questionnaire, in addition to an extra control-group-only questionnaire that measured their longterm exposure to other sources of political information.
The researcher’s hypotheses, that 1) exposure to The Daily Show lowers overall candidate
evaluations and 2) that it lowers evaluations of the lesser known candidates more than the ones
that are well known, were supported by the data analysis. It also supported the hypotheses that
3) exposure increased cynicism toward both the electoral process and 4) the news media. No
such significant relationships were observed for the viewers of the CBS Evening News clip.
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The researchers conclude that, because cynicism “reflects low external efficacy,” young
Americans who are exposed to The Daily Show have lower external efficacy—that is, they do not
think governmental authorities and institutions are responsive to citizen demands. However, one
survey question measuring internal efficacy, defined as “beliefs about one’s own competence to
understand, and to participate effectively in, politics,” indicated that it is greater for those
exposed to The Daily Show. The authors explain that “Stewart’s style of humor paints the
complexities of politics as a function of the absurdity and incompetence of political elites, thus
leading viewers to blame any lack of understanding not on themselves but on those who run the
system. In presenting politics as the theater of the absurd, Stewart seemingly simplifies it”
(p.362).
The researchers note that in this laboratory experiment, those who reported watching The
Daily Show less frequently (“hardly ever” or “never”) were more susceptible to the attitudinal
affects than regular viewers, whom they suggest have developed a high level of cynicism from
their prior experience with the show. But the implications are not entirely clear; while The Daily
Show may have a clear affect on young people’s opinions and attitudes, it did not measure if it
changes their civic behaviors.
Xiaoxia Cao and Paul R. Brewer (2008) attempted to extend the study to examine
political participation behaviors associated with lowered trust and cynical attitudes cultivated by
The Daily Show. They sought to challenge the notion by Baumgartner and Morris (2006) that
exposure to the program has the potential to “dampen participation…by contributing to a sense
of political alienation from the political process” by showing a positive correlation between
exposure to political comedy shows and some forms of political participation (qtd. in Cao and
Brewer 2008:90). Believing that the increased internal political efficacy observed in
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Baumgartner and Morris’ study are a strong indicator of political participation, and that negative
portrayals of politicians and governmental institutions can trigger anxiety and motivate political
action, they hypothesized a positive relationship between exposure to political comedy shows
and political participation.
Through a telephone survey conducted during the early stages of the campaign for the
2004 Democratic presidential nomination (Dec. 2004- Jan. 2004), 1,249 randomly-selected
respondents were asked how often they learned something about the campaign or candidates
from political comedy shows. They were also asked how often they participated in one of the
following activities (measures of political participation): contacting an elected official, attending
a campaign event, joining an organization in support of a particular cause, and contributing
money to a candidate running for public office. Respondents also answered questions measuring
political interest, political knowledge, exposure to traditional and online news sources, exposure
to late-night talk shows, partisanship, and demographics. They discovered that approximately
one quarter of Americans regularly or sometimes learned about the democratic race from
political comedy shows, and such learning was positively correlated with two forms of political
participation: attending a campaign event and joining an organization (the relationship between
learning and contacting an elected official and contributing money to a candidate was not
statistically significant).
It is important to note that the researchers used the survey variable “learning from
political comedy shows” as a proxy for “exposure from political comedy shows,” and measured
only a few types of political participation within the context of an election. They did not
measure whether respondents were more or less likely to vote in an election or engage in a
political protest—types of participation activities that may be relevant to the definitions of
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citizenship in the current socio-political landscape. The authors also caution that, although their
findings challenge a major criticism of political comedy shows, they have yet to expose the
causal mechanisms that relate exposure to participation. They note that the correlations may
reflect the potential of such shows to foster internal efficacy, induce concern, or create shared
experiences among viewers (p.97). Additionally, Fox, Koloen, and Sahin’s study (2007)
suggests that the comic approach these programs have in presenting political information may
have measurable psychological and physiological effects on the viewer. There is evidence that
the often negative portrayals of politicians by the broadcast media constitute “socially
threatening information,” which may trigger the aversive system (p.223). In contrast, the
appetitive system is activated by the humor and laughter of The Daily Show. Thus, the ways we
enjoy and learn from political parody might be more fundamentally subconscious than we might
assume and difficult to measure through self-reported survey data.
In an attempt to study the correlation between political comedy and political participation
without arguing about what standard conclusions can be drawn from the construct of “political
cynicism,” Young and Esralew (2011) looked directly at political behaviors during the 2004
presidential primaries which they believed were particularly indicative of an engaged electorate
and a healthy democracy: talking with others about why they should vote for a particular
candidate; attending political meetings, speeches or rallies in support of a particular candidate;
performing work for one of the candidates; giving money to a presidential campaign; or
displaying campaign signs, stickers, or apparel (p.105). Additionally, they measured forms of
political discussion, including how many days they had engaged in discussions about politics
with family and friends, people at work, or in public and private online forums. Using two types
of exposure (general late-night comedy and The Daily Show specific), they controlled for overall
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candidate evaluation, party identification, political ideology, traditional political media exposure,
interest in politics, civic knowledge, in addition to general demographic variables. They
concluded that exposure to The Daily Show was a significant positive predictor of political
participation and political discussion, and that political knowledge was not a moderating factor.
Several studies have been conducted that attempt to show what sort of information or
political knowledge is gleaned from comedy programs. Many, such as the 2007 Pew Center
survey, indicate that “regular viewers of The Daily Show and The Colbert Report were most
likely to score in the highest percentile on knowledge of current affairs,” but the study leaves
open the possibility that high level of knowledge among this population indicates they are likely
to receive information from other sources in addition to the comedy programs. People who
enjoy and regularly watch The Daily Show may simply be more interested in political topics, and
therefore are more informed compared to those who do not consume as much political news.
Xiaoxia Cao (2010) found that watching The Daily Show was positively associated with
attentiveness to the issues that were frequently covered on the program (attentiveness being
defined as ability “to recognize and selectively process information about a topic,” not only
recognizing its existence, but motivating one to pay attention to additional information about the
topic [p.30]). Using theories of low-information rationality, she suggests that citizens rely on
political information they glean from entertainment programs because “the effort spent in
collecting large amounts of political information is not justified by the small chance that an
individual may influence political outcomes” (p.30). Therefore, she argues that The Daily Show
appeals to politically apathetic people seeking entertainment, and that they, too, experience
politically-positive effects though viewing.
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In this study, Cao used two national telephone surveys to examine the relationship
between exposure to The Daily Show and attentiveness to the Afghanistan War in 2002 and to
news about the candidates leading up to the 2004 presidential election. The study controlled for
exposure to a variety of traditional news sources, political knowledge, voting in past elections,
strength of partisanship, and demographic variables such as education and income. It was
discovered that as many as 20 percent of the show’s viewers reported as being not inclined to
follow politics, and in fact were not as interested in politics as consumers of traditional news
sources. However, these viewers experienced increased attention to the issues discussed
frequently on the program, with the magnitude of the effect decreasing for those who are more
politically attentive. Cao suggests that, “it is people who seek entertaining shows that such
programs tend to benefit in the current media environment,” in which the multiplicity of media
choices have created a gap in knowledge and participation between politically apathetic people
and political junkies (Prior, 2007) (p.42).
Communications researcher Barry A. Hollander (2005) used national survey data to
support the hypothesis that consumption of comedy and late-night programs is associated with
recognition of campaign information (rather than actual recall of such information), with age
having a modest interaction with such effects. The study’s methodical strategy emphasized the
importance distinction between recognition and recall of campaign information in the study of
knowledge acquisition and subsequent behavioral effects of political media, particularly among
youth. Because television is a passive medium that does not require a great amount of cognitive
effort to consume, lack of critical engagement with the material likely leads to the ability to
recognize information, but not remember the specific details. He explains, “Late-night television
viewing increases what young people think they know about a political campaign but provides at
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best modest improvements to actual recall of events associated with the campaign” (p.411).
Hollander cautions that such an effect may cause an audience to turn off mainstream news
sources, leaving political comedy their only source of information. Thus, the “knowledge”
purported by many studies to increase with viewership of political comedy shows may not tell
the entire story. The question remains if what people are learning from such shows is enough to
make them competent, motivated political participants.
Baumgartner and Morris (2011) argue that, whatever the effect of The Daily Show on
attention or attitudes toward politics, “the contributions of TDS to the political engagement of
young adults are negligible,” and the cynicism toward government and politics it presents has
“potential negative effects on heavy viewers” (p.64). In a survey-based study comparing the
differences in exposure effects on heavy, moderate, casual, and non- viewers of The Daily Show,
they noticed that heavy viewers were more likely to agree with the statement “Public officials
don’t care much what people like me think” and disagree with the statement “I have faith the
U.S. electoral system,” indicating an association between heavy viewing and greater levels of
political cynicism.
The experimental and survey studies have been largely inconclusive in determining the
real impacts of political satire on individual knowledge, attitudes, or behaviors, in part due to the
difficulty of determining causal relationships, isolating variables, and operationalizing complex
concepts. Furthermore, the scope of study is very narrow, using nearly exclusively a young adult
sample populations and exposure to The Daily Show as the independent variable. What these
studies do reveal, however, is the variety of ways mediated satirical messages can influence realworld democratic functions, and provide a basis for the current study to extend the examination
of political news parody and conceptions of citizenship.
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CONCLUSION
The authority of the government and the news media to construct our social reality is
becoming increasingly undermined, and news parody that targets the political realm is no doubt a
contributing factor toward widespread institutional distrust among the nation’s populace.
Political satire has historically played an important role in how people conceptualize their
relation to the democratic process, and the current American socio-political landscape is a
particularly poignant example.
The reviewed literature, taken as a whole, indicates that political parody is a burgeoning
topic for researchers, extending across disciplines, from Communications and Media studies, to
Political Science to Sociology. In an age of declining political and institutional trust and
growing popularity of political comedy shows, there is widespread interest in the purpose,
agenda, style, and effects of such programs. While many studies have attempted to measure the
social-psychological effects of viewership on individuals, differences in theory,
operationalization, and methods have yielded different conclusions. It is difficult to determine
how pervasive the observed effects are, what the mediating variables are, and what the causal
relationship between variables is. There is debate, within the academic sphere and larger society,
as to whether shows of this type are harmful to democracy, or helpful.
Experimental studies have shown that exposure to The Daily Show increases political
knowledge (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2007b), but many researchers
(e.g. Hollander 2005) have expressed concern with measures of knowledge and the causal
relationships pertaining to exposure and reception of information. There is also evidence that
political information presented as entertainment is one way to increase attentiveness to the world
of politics, particularly among the politically apathetic (Cao 2010), and the use of humor is
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conducive to positive feelings toward the topic being presented (Fox, Koloen, and Sahin 2007).
As for attitudes, while there is no doubt that ironic cynicism reigns as the spirit of the parodic
discourse, there is debate as to how the messages translate to audiences. Some believe political
satire may raise internal efficacy while simultaneously lowering external efficacy (Baumgartner
and Morris 2006), while others (Cao and Brewer 2008; Baumgartner and Morris 2011) have
argued whether such changes in attitude have any actual effect on behaviors of political
participation.
As experimental and survey studies have begun to develop an understanding of the role
of political parody for individuals, there is much research left to be done to place these media
effects in the larger social context. News media are tools that help us configure our social
reality, determining what information the public hears every day, and from what point of view.
The socializing nature of media, more generally, tells us what we should be concerned about and
how we should respond. However, in a culture of increasing anti-intellectualism and antiauthoritarianism, led by a generation that tends to ironically detach themselves from
institutionalized structures (Van Heertrum 2011), the authority of journalists to create our reality
in the frame of power relationships is being undermined. In the wake of such journalistic
scandals as Watergate, so-called objective, neutral journalism seems unworthy of shaping our
reality. But what are we to replace it with? With so much information in the world, and our
limited ability to gather and comprehend it, we rely on organizations with resources to do so for
us. When they lose credibility, however, it becomes almost inconsequential who we trust. Fake
news may be becoming just as influential to the construction of our reality as the “real” thing,
and the delineation between the two types of programs seems less and less significant (McBeth
and Clemons 2011).
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Many media critics and journalists (e.g. Schudson 1999) express admiration for the
satirical take on news, arguing that Jon Stewart and the like are performing more valuable critical
journalism than the traditional news media. In their redefinitions of journalistic practices
through discursive integration, they challenge the assumed authority of news media and urge
them to devote their efforts more toward honesty and less toward spectacle. However, with the
disclaimer that they are presenting “fake news,” the comedians are able to shirk journalistic
conventions, such as objectivity and neutrality, without threat of libel. In an interview with
NPR, Jon Stewart (2004b) emphasized the difference between journalistic and comedic integrity
in his work: “We don't fact-check [and] look at context because of any journalistic criteria that
has to be met; we do that because jokes don't work when they're lies. We fact-check so when we
tell a joke, it hits you at sort of a gut level — not because we have a journalistic integrity, [but
because] hopefully we have a comedic integrity that we don't want to violate."
Within this context of this media crisis, increasingly infused with a cynical and antiauthoritarian public discourse, it is important to ask the question: what does it mean to be an
American citizen in the postmodern democratic society, and who is best equipped to construct
these definitions? The next chapter will explore these questions and ask, what is the role of
political news parody in developing and promoting a particular definition of citizenship?
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY
INTRODUCTION
The literature reviewed above discusses the current climate of mainstream political
journalism and the growing role of political news parody within the context of diminishing
public trust in media and government. It emphasizes the potential for entertainment programs
such as The Daily Show, The Colbert Report or The Onion News Network to have a significant
impact on the public perception of governing institutions, and on people’s understanding of their
social positions relative to them. The theoretical section of this study will begin with an
assessment of the relationship between individuals and government with a focus on the crisis of
political legitimation that has risen out of the modernization process. The chapter will define to
what extent political structures are legitimated through mediated public discourse and the effect
of this discourse on cultural understandings of democratic citizenship. The role of mass media in
“colonizing” political discourse will be introduced, and will further suggest that political satire is
an alternative discourse that functions to simultaneously critique media narratives and legitimate
political structures. Within this framework, this discussion will consider the theoretical function
of news-style political parody in regards to defining citizenship for contemporary Americans. It
will ask if this type of political discourse is revolutionary or liberal in nature. Ultimately, in
examining the role of satirical discourse in our society, this study aims to discover whether this
type of “alternative” discourse legitimizes or undermines political structures.

REFLEXIVE MODERNITY AND THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMATION
We live in a fragmented, politically polarized society that is increasingly antiauthoritarian and anti-intellectual. Through industrialization and modernization, small,
homogenous communities have given way to large, diverse and disconnected worlds; in this
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process, the nature of political discourse has changed. Subsequently, conceptions of citizenship
have evolved. Lacking frequent direct interaction with governing bodies or comprehensive
understanding of socio-political structures, individuals in the modern era struggle to figure out
how they fit into—and function as part of—a democratic society. What has occurred in the
attempt to rationalize the modern American political system is the adoption of doctrinal
worldviews that frame political and social issues according to a set of beliefs rather than
empirically-based comprehensions of social facts. It is obvious when observing the political
arena that polarization of beliefs effectively cripples many attempts at legislative action,
particularly at the national level.
When presented to the public through a mediated lens, political partisanship further
begets a cynical populace. A sizable body of evidence indicates that today’s Americans doubt
the efficacy of their government, the accuracy of their information sources, the intelligence of
their neighbors, or their own ability to affect the system in any way. The combination of
polarized anti-intellectual discourse in political media and pervasive cynicism in the populous
opens up a space for political satire to act as an appealing alternative discourse. What The
Onion, The Daily Show and The Colbert Report do best is to point out the absurdities and
hypocrisies in government and in the media that reports on it. Their use of irony in presenting
political news to their audiences offers alternative conceptualizations of what these institutions
stand for, and where we as citizens stand in relationship to them.
To define the modern era in which we use comedy as an alternative political discourse to
the “objective” news media, I will look at how social theorists Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck
describe modern reflexivity and new threats to political legitimation that did not exist in

39
traditional societies. Their characterizations of contemporary society provide the foundation for
the discussion of deliberative democracy, communicative action and citizenship.
According to Anthony Giddens, social action within modern society differs from
traditional society in several key ways. First, people have grown less concerned about the limits
of social action as prescribed by custom or tradition. Instead of claiming knowledge or
legitimacy of facets of life based on cultural precedent, modern collectives are faced with a much
broader range of choices, and therefore must engage in much more thorough consideration and
analysis before action is taken. Giddens (1990) argues that what he terms “the reflexive
monitoring of action” is a necessary basic element of system reproduction in the modern era. He
explains, “The reflexivity of modern social life consists in the fact that social practices are
constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very
practices, thus constitutively altering their character” (1990:38).
Pervasive reflexivity alters peoples’ conceptions of knowledge and truth. While
traditional societies justified their beliefs and patterns of action by simply consulting the wisdom
of previous generations, modern societies depend on groups of experts to discover and define
information for the rest of society. Giddens points out, however, that it is impossible to have
complete trust in these supposed arbiters of knowledge, because every element of a knowledge
system is left open for revision should new information be discovered. He argues that this
constant reflexivity is actually subversive to reason, which is understood as the acquisition of
certain knowledge. Because we are less assured of our culture’s ability to know anything for
certain, we have come to have less faith in the natural sciences and the institutions that have
traditionally held power.
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Ulrich Beck describes this undermining of knowledge institutions in his discussion of
modernity as a “risk society.” Modern civilization, according to Beck (1992):
had set out to remove ascriptions, to evolve privacy, and to free people from the
constraints of nature and tradition, [and] there is thus emerging a new global ascription of
risks, against which individual decisions hardly exist…The experience of this
victimization by risks which is closed to decisions makes understandable much of the
shock, the helpless rage and the ‘no future’ feelings with which many people react
ambivalently and with necessarily exploitative criticism to the latest achievements of
technical civilization. (P.41)

Here, Beck identifies the conditions of life in a globalized and interdependent modern society as
the root of cynical attitudes within the culture. Institutional distrust stems from “systematic
causes that coincide with the motor of progress and profit” (p. 40). People, particularly those in
leadership positions, are constantly questioning whether our historical conceptualization of social
progress in the form of economic industrialization and scientific rationality are “still correct” (p.
40). The debates about the ideal future of society are contentious, and “take on the character of
doctrinal struggles within civilization over the proper road for modernity” (p. 40). For Beck,
democratic citizenship has lost much of its authority to act in individuals’ independent interest.
Instead, people vote in support of particular belief systems that bolster the authority of political
actors or organizations. The multiplicity and diversity of potential political wills among the
United States population is reduced to a handful of ideologies corresponding to partisan
platforms. Party leaders assert their positions in opposition to the others by evoking risks and
using conflictual rhetoric, creating in citizens feelings of helplessness because they cannot
effectively assert their particular political will through the representative system of governance.
Thus, Giddens and Beck suggest that the fragmentation and polarization of contemporary
society has left individuals without a trusted framework for understanding their social world. As
communities experience the breakdown of traditional forms of cohesion and methods of direct
discourse, the question of legitimation becomes increasingly important. How do we rationalize
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our nation’s governing structures and come to see them as legitimate forces of social control? In
the American context, it has much to do with the notion of citizenship, the individual’s right and
duty to elect representatives into the administration. The following section will look more
closely at the concept of democratic citizenship and its evolution over time. As I will discuss,
mediated political discourses, including satirical texts, have played a critical role in defining the
concept and legitimizing it within contemporary society.

DEFINING CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship, as a theoretical concept, is far from static. Its definitive characteristics are
historically and contextually specific, and sensitive to forces of political and ideological change.
Much of the contemporary theoretical work on citizenship begins with British sociologist T.H.
Marshall, who is considered central to debates regarding the complexities of the relationship
between citizenship and the economic structure of capitalist society. Although Marshall has
been widely critiqued for ethnocentrism, as he considers citizenship only in the English case,
Bryan S. Turner (1990) contends that his theory necessarily contains universalistic elements. For
example, he points out that the historical development of citizenship in many western societies
“involves a transition from societies based on ascriptive criteria to societies based upon
achievement criteria” (1990:194), such that the status of citizen is not confined to particular
birthplaces or ethnicities, but hypothetically available to anyone who earns it by following
established procedures. The historical evolution of citizenship has been shaped in every society
by political and cultural conflicts, and relies on a state institution to negotiate the contradictions
between rights and freedoms. According to Turner, Marshall’s seminal theory considers
citizenship the primary political means for resolving “the contradiction between the formal
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political equality of the franchise and the persistence of extensive social and economic
inequality, ultimately rooted in the character of the capitalist marketplace and the existence of
private property” (1990:191). Defining citizenship, therefore, is a complex task, not only for
scholars of the topic, but for every individual who considers themselves a citizen of a nation.
Changing definitions of American citizenship can be considered along the evolutionary
trajectory theorized by Marshall (as described in Turner 1990:191). The various models of
citizenship described by Marshall relate closely to Jürgen Habermas’ (1998) conceptualizations
of democracy. In the eighteenth century when the nation was founded, Marshall argued that
there was a particular emphasis on civil rights, which refer to the legal status of individuals,
protection of their private interests from government intervention, and access to the legal system.
In Habermas’ liberal understanding of democracy, society is seen as “a system of marketstructured interactions of private persons and their labor” (1998:239). The government is a
purely administrative organization whose function is to bind together private interests and use its
political power to work toward collective goals. In this model, “the citizen status is determined
primarily by the individual rights he or she has vis-à-vis the state and other citizens…[and]
individual rights are negative rights that guarantee a domain of freedom of choice within which
legal persons are freed from external compulsion” (Habermas 1998:240). In this view, citizens
are politically passive; they are granted the opportunity to assert their private interests by electing
members of government bodies and asserting their aggregate political will on the administration.
Their primary political role is determining whether or not government exercises its authority in
the interest of its citizens.
The next century, according to Marshall, was more broadly defined by struggles for
political rights, referring to people’s equal access to parliamentary bodies via the electoral
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system, which would enable them to articulate their interests (Turner 1990). This historical trend
relates to Habermas’ republican model of democracy, which considers politics as part of the
socialization process, “the medium in which the members of quasi-natural solidarity
communities become aware of their dependence on one another and, acting with full deliberation
as citizens, further shape and develop existing relations of reciprocal recognition into an
association of free and equal consociates under law” (1998:240). Rather than freedom from
external compulsion, these positive rights of citizenship guarantee the possibility of political
participation, “through which the citizens make themselves into what they want to be –
politically responsible subjects of a community of free and equal citizens” (1998:241).
Citizenship in this sense emphasizes dutiful civic behavior, and an inclusive process of opinionand will-formation in which legislative acts are designed to be in the equal interest of all. This
understanding of democratic citizenship requires a sphere of political discourse oriented toward a
mutual understanding. The expansion of mass media in the nineteenth century served this role
and contributed to the changing nature of American citizenship from the liberal model (civil
rights) to the republican model (political rights).
Finally, in the modern era, Marshall argues that capitalist democracies have turned their
focus toward social rights, which are the foundation of the welfare system (Turner 1990). This
discussion takes place within Habermas’ third model of democracy called “deliberative politics,”
which takes into greater consideration the pluralism and fragmentation of modern society.
Although communicative discourse works to help individuals understand their position within a
society and come to mutual agreements, there exists a multitude of underlying specific “interests
and value-orientations that are by no means constitutive of the identity of the political
community as a whole, that is, for the totality of an intersubjectively shared form of life”
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(1998:245). Not every political goal, thus, represents the entire community on which it might
have an effect. Therefore, political goals must be negotiated and compromises much be reached,
while adhering to general moral principles that extend even beyond the legal community.
Habermas asserts that, “Everything depends on the conditions of communication and the
procedures that lend the institutionalized opinion- and will-formation their legitimating force”
(1998:245).
In his analysis of the character of modern social membership and political participation,
which considers Marshall’s theory in light of major critiques of his work, Turner (1990)
developed a conceptual framework for comparing the definitions of citizenship between various
western societies that synthesizes the analytical levels of individual citizen, the organization of
social rights, and the context of institutional democracy. His typology contains four ideal-type
political contexts in which citizen rights are created and institutionalized. These occur at the
intersection of two aspects: first, citizen rights can be seen as either handed down from the state
in return for pragmatic cooperation (“above”) or achieved as the outcome of a struggle by
subordinate groups for benefits (“below”). The other axis differentiates between the interaction
of the individual and the state in either the “public” or “private” arena, referring to the notion that
political action is motivated by either communal or individual interests. The public sphere is
defined by its concerns with inclusion and generality of interests (as opposed to particularity),
and relies on the belief that all citizens must participate in political processes in order to achieve
fair decisions and maintain communal bonds (Young 1995). The private sphere incorporates
individual and particular group interests, and employs group bargaining sessions as political
procedure, rather than holding discussions inclusive of all who are potentially affected by
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decisions (Young 1995). Combinations of social perspectives on citizen rights and political
space, therefore, constitute the variety of public discourse in western political traditions.
Within this typology, Turner classifies American liberalism as citizenship “from below”
and centered in the “private space.” He describes the American political discourse as a strong
rejection of centralized power and centered on the rights and privileges of independent citizens.
Due to a strong tradition of American individualism and a federal system tied to checks and
balances, there is a weak tradition of social citizenship, as evidenced by the state’s limited and
late-developing welfare system. Although political discourse is increasingly happening within
the public sphere, Turner argues, “To some extent the dominance of individualism and the value
of personal success have meant that the ‘public arena’ is typically understood in terms of
individual involvement in local voluntary associations” (1990:209). Because citizenship is so
particular and privatized, Young argues that that “interest group pluralism…institutionalizes and
encourages egoistic, self-regarding view of political processes, one that sees parties entering the
political competition for scarce goods and privileges only in order to maximize their own gain,
and therefore they need not listen to or respond to the claims of others who have their own point
of view” (2011:183). Political discourse in contemporary America has indeed taken on the
character of competing doctrinal worldviews as Giddens described, and has fundamentally
altered ordinary Americans’ perceptions of citizenship.
The modern understanding of democratic citizenship is quite different from the one
Alexis de Tocqueville observed nearly two hundred years ago and described in Democracy in
America. As Bellah et al. (1985) explain, the early-American township viewed politics as simply
getting involved with one’s neighbors and reaching moral consensus within the community
through face-to-face discussion. Pluralism has since changed the meaning of politics to denote
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the pursuit by different interest groups to gain strategic advantage, according to agreed-upon
rules. This climate has given rise to “professional politicians,” who represent interest groups and
skillfully build alliances and engage in interest bargaining. Ordinary Americans generally view
“politics of interest” as negative, but also “a kind of necessary evil in a large, diverse society, as
a reluctantly agreed-to second best to consensual democracy” (p.200). Bellah et al. caution,
however, that the public regard these proceedings as not entirely legitimate in the moral sense.
Instead of developing public policy by means of community discussion and consensus-making
(the democratic ideal), it is achieved through “competition among groups in which inequalities of
power, influence, and moral probity become highly visible as determinants of the outcome”
(pp.200-201). The ordinary American is not capable of exercising influence in the highly
complicated and adversarial realm of national politics. Instead, the typical expression of
individual political will is support for a candidate, and for many, participatory citizenship
involves nothing more than casting the occasional ballot.
The above characterizations of modern American democracy as particular and
discursively polarized present the primary conflict of citizenship in our society: people remain
strongly individualistic and partial to their own economic interests, and often struggle to relate
the ideal image of citizen to the large-scale political forces that shape their lives (Bellah et. al.
1985:199). Yet, the political discourse that Habermas (1989) argues is necessary for legitimating
systems of government control has been colonized by the mass media, and turned formerly
critical, politically active citizens into passive consumers of political information. Television
punditry and political debate has become something that we consume rather than participate in.
It stands to reason, then, that media texts must actively construct a view of citizenship that
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rationalizes public individuals as participants of self-interested group bargaining, as opposed to
being active participants in community consensus-making.
In order to determine what sort of discourse is necessary for the democratic government
to remain valid in the eyes of its citizens, I will consider Jürgen Habermas’ theories of
communicative action and deliberative democracy, which suggest that political and legal
arrangements are legitimated through the processes of debating them. In the fragmented society,
mass media narratives become the primary landscape in which deliberation occurs, including the
reconciliation between traditional media narratives and the satirical discourses which stand next
to and critique them.

HABERMAS: COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AND DELIBERATIVE DISCOURSE
There is no doubt that political discourse and ideas about citizenship have evolved as
mass media has gained prominence in our daily lives. J.G. A. Pocock writes:
When a world of persons, actions, and things becomes a world of persons,
actions, and linguistic or electronic constructs that have no authors, it clearly
becomes much easier for the things—grown much more powerful because they
are no longer real—to multiply and take charge, controlling, and determining
persons and actions that no longer control, determine, or even produce them.
Under these conditions of the information explosion, we have—since we are still
under the imperatives of the classical ideal—to find means of affirming that we
are citizens: that is, of affirming that we are persons and associating with other
persons to have voice and action in the making of our worlds. (1995:52).

Jürgen Habermas (1984) argues that media have, in large part, taken over the role of
knowledge-making and the reproduction of social systems. In traditional societies, knowledge
was woven directly into the fabric of community, rationalized and institutionalized through
direct discussion with community members and leaders. Political frameworks were created and
understood directly by those under their jurisdiction. In the modern era, however, direct
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discourse is impossible due to the size and scope of the nation. Discourse, by necessity, has
become mediated and thus abstracted from the individual consciousness. For the most part,
national politics is no longer discussed between neighbors for, I would argue, two main reasons:
a) the risk of offending people whose beliefs fall on opposite end of the doctrinal spectrum and
b) due to the perception that the discussion will have no real effect on the society at large.
However, political discourse thrives on television, radio, newspapers and internet forums, where
political elites and media pundits monopolize the conversation according to their particular
agenda. As a result, citizens’ understanding of the political world is through a particular lens,
one that is polarized and hyped in a persistently reflexive manner.
In his influential work “The Theory of Communicative Action,” Habermas (1984) argues
that communication is the basis of social life, the means by which humans coordinate their
activities and reproduce the conditions necessary for maintaining themselves as a species. He
writes that communicative action, as a mechanism for reproducing the lifeworld “in the semantic
dimension,” performs the following functions:
It secures a continuity of tradition and coherence of knowledge sufficient for daily
practice…ensures that newly arising situations are connected up with existing conditions
in the world in the dimension of social space: it takes care of coordinating actions by way
of legitimately regulated interpersonal relations and stabilizes the identity of groups to an
extent sufficient for everyday practices…ensures that newly arising situations are
connected up with existing situations in the world in the dimension of historical time: it
secures of succeeding generations the acquisition of generalized competences for action
and sees to it that individual life histories are in harmony with collective forms of life

(1984 Vol.2:140-1).
Habermas provides situations, identifiable in modern American culture, where these three
functions have failed (1984 Vol.2:140-1). The first, which measures continuity and coherence of
knowledge by the extent to which it is rationalized and validated, recognizes that disturbances in
cultural reproduction results in the loss of valid interpretive schemes and a deficit of meaning
which leads further to a crisis of legitimation. When the stabilization of group identities is
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difficult and solidarity among its members is weak, anomie and conflict arise between social
actors. Finally, when the socialization process fails for an individual, the actor lacks the ability
to maintain the intersubjectivity of action situations, and is diagnosed with psychopathologies
and subsequent feelings of alienation. Institutionalized mass communication systems, such as
contemporary journalism, often fail to provide collective and individual meaning or to
effectively coordinate social action. In this social condition, there is a space for political news
parody, which mocks the type of communicative action it considers inadequate for performing
this critical function, while simultaneously reifying the original form as a useful platform to
debate civic concepts.
Habermas contends that communicative action is particularly crucial to the process of
validating and legitimizing all aspects of the social and political world. He writes that “a
lifeworld can be regarded as rationalized to the extent that it permits interactions that are not
guided by normatively ascribed agreement but—directly or indirectly—by communicatively
achieved understanding” (1984 Vol.1:340). However, the modern era is characterized by a
“decentration of our understanding of the world and the differentiation of various universal
validity claims” (1984 Vol.1:397). Like Giddens and Beck, Habermas acknowledges that we can
no longer rely on tradition alone to legitimize particular civic interpretations or to create
collective understanding. We require mass communication forms to help us make sense of our
large, fragmented social world—even if we don’t always completely trust the media’s
interpretation. Mediated discourses are nevertheless rational, and therefore produce knowledge
and conceptual frameworks of understanding for the majority of citizens.
To coordinate social understanding, Habermas argues that industrialized cultures have
developed three spheres of differentiated knowledge systems and processes of learning (1984
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Vol.1:340): (1) scientific enterprise, which deals with empirical-scientific problems according to
internal standards of truth, independent from moral or theological doctrines; (2) artistic
enterprise, which enacts a professional sphere of aesthetic criticism to mediate the reception of
works of art to the public; and (3) professional intellectual enterprise, which deals with questions
of ethics, political theory, and law. Thus, knowledge production in today’s society is
institutionalized and specialized, but occupies a much riskier role that is constantly under threat
by differentiated lifestyles and the reflexivity of social action. While journalism may be
considered an industry of the professional-intellectual sphere, its claims to truth and knowledge
are extremely vulnerable to criticism and debate, particularly in the sphere of public politics.
Journalistic parody, however, falls more firmly in the sphere of artistic enterprise, mediating the
reception of political information through a highly critical lens. The satirists’ interpretation of
reality is highly cynical in regards to governments’ political domination of private individuals
and the media’s propagation of social knowledge.
Habermas’ proposed solution to the legitimation crisis is the model of “deliberative
democracy,” in which both informal and legally institutionalized discursive procedures are also
the primary processes by which political structures are legitimized. The act of discussion and
debate inherently supports the presumption that the outcomes are rational, and decided
democratically. In this model, the institutionalized processes of opinion- and will-formation are
much more important to a person’s acceptance of political domination than is an understanding
of the constitution of the state (Habermas 1998). His theory works to explain the intersubjective
communication processes within and between government bodies and informal public networks.
It is in the debate between these two spheres of discussion that rational opinion- and willformation takes place concerning political issues. The deliberative democracy model requires an
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active public sphere of political communication, which consists of voluntary discussion among
citizens who depend on expert information—often obtained via print and electronic media.
Habermas believes that this “communicatively generated power is transformed into
admistratively usable power” through elections and legislative rulings (1998:249). Thus, not
only is political discourse rational, it amalgamates political will of the masses in a
communicative force that complements the two other main social forces: administrative power
and economic power.
Habermas further contends that modern media have replaced language as the primary
mechanism for coordinating social action, and have “steered” social action to adhere to
purposefully rational, formalized frames of understanding. In the western world,
commercialized media is closely tied to capitalist and consumerist ideologies. Habermas explains
this connection, writing that media “uncouple action from processes of reaching understanding
and coordinate it via generalized instrumental values such as money and power” (1984
Vol.1:342). The links between the economic and administrative systems and the “lifeworld” are
formally organized, and in fact regulated by law (1984). Media, as an institution, therefore must
simultaneously legitimize the legal order and earn legitimacy through it. Under certain
conditions of the modern capitalist society, Habermas explains, media “colonizes the lifeworld,”
nearly completely taking over the responsibility of coordinating social understanding according
to the tenets of capitalism. The subsystems of the economy and the state are controlled by the
media, who “intervene with monetary and bureaucratic means in the symbolic reproduction of
the lifeworld” (1984 Vol.2:356). The colonization of the lifeworld by the media occurs under
four specific conditions which are observable in contemporary American society (1984
Vol.2:356):
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(1) “When traditional forms of life are so far dismantled so that the structural
components of the lifeworld (culture, society, and personality) have been differentiated to a great
extent.” As discussed above in regards to the work of Giddens and Beck, fragmentation and
polarization are defining characteristics of modern society. The breakdown of traditional social
integration and direct democratic discourse presents a crisis of legitimation not only in regards to
political structures, but also in determining what defines our culture and how we relate to our
social environments.
(2) “When exchange relations between the subsystems [the formal economy and the
state] and the lifeworld are regulated through differentiated roles,” for example, individuals
serving as employees of state-regulated workplaces, as private consumers, as “clients” to
government bureaucracies, and as participants in the political legitimation process. The links
between individuals and the organizing structures of society are multiple and varied, but the
modern system values citizens primarily for their economic contributions.
(3) “When the real abstractions that make available the labor power of the employed
make possible the mobilization of the vote of the electorate are tolerated by those affected as a
trade-off against social rewards (in terms of time and money)” and (4) “where these
compensations are financed according to the welfare-state pattern from the gains of capitalist
growth and are canalized into those roles in which, withdrawn from the world of work and the
public sphere, privatized hopes for self-actualization and self-determination are primarily
located, namely, in the roles of consumer and client.” These two final conditions illuminate the
key fact that structural realities of our society are masked in the way we view the relationship
between economy and state. In the public discussion of political issues, labor is abstracted,
engaging individuals not as workers, but instead as clients and consumers of capitalism. The
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inequalities and misrepresentations inherent in this system are tolerated because of the supposed
rewards we receive under capitalism: primarily the intangible notions of self-actualization and
self-determination which are the ideological driving force behind the “American dream.”
Under these conditions, national media has taken over responsibility for our culture, our
social integration, our sense of self, our exchange relations, and crafting motivations for
individual political participation based on private interest. It has hijacked political discourse,
abstracting it from our real lived experiences and placing it in the context of particular narratives
which mask structural issues, placate workers, and justify social inequalities. Political
legitimation still occurs communicatively, but in a realm essentially inaccessible to the majority
of citizens. We are consumers of political discourse rather than participants.
In this context, political satire may serve a variety of roles. It acts as an alternative
discourse that plays off of the primary media narratives; it deconstructs them, and exposes them
as mythic, and often counter to the real interest of the public in consideration of structural issues.
On the other hand, it may be viewed as part of the media landscape in which deliberation of
issues strengthens the legitimation of the very structures it pokes fun at. The classification of
satire is at the center of the current debate: can it be considered an active part of deliberative
discourse that compensates for the legitimation failures of a mass communication system? Or is
it merely an artistic form of communication that represents the extreme of cultural cynicism? A
closer look at the politics of ironic discourse may provide further insight into the potential impact
of news-style political parody on modern conceptions of political power and citizenship.
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THE POLITICS OF IRONY
Linda Hutcheon, author of “Irony’s Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony” argues that
all irony is political because it necessarily “involves relations of power based in relations of
communication” (1994:2). If, as Habermas believes, public discourse is the core of political
legitimation processes, then it is absolutely necessary to study ironic discourses and determine
how they affect both citizens and the administration. The satirist’ role is not easily defined; to
say he or she belongs to a particular revolutionist agenda would be reductive. Bakhtin’s analysis
of medieval carnival—one of the earliest forms of parodic discourse—recognized that parody
necessarily depends on established hierarchies of power and discursive conventions in order to
break them. The dialogic discourse of carnival symbolically grants the public power over their
rulers, but only temporarily, and with awareness that it is merely “play.” Satire challenges
official discourses, but does not attempt to replace them (Achter 2008). Such a view, when
translated into the modern context, strips news-style political satire of its potential revolutionary
power, and in fact suggests it functions to legitimate the current order. By mocking political
figures and journalistic conventions, it reinforces their importance as the topics we should be
concerned with and the rhetorical style through which we absorb social information. However,
although Bakhtin did not believe satire was revolutionary, he viewed carnival as “an act of
renewal and a regeneration of hope and new possibilities among people” (Achter 2008:282).
This view is devoid of cynicism, yet not powerful enough to demand or effect change in the
power structure. Thus, satire is, as Achter describes, an “ambiguous response to a culture that
may have become ossified, too monologic” (p.282). A satirical critique of administrative
absurdities has no direct effect on the system, yet it conceives of all who participate in the
conversation as publically politically active.
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The ambiguity of ironic discourse, according to Hutcheon is embedded in the fact that it
can serve a wide range of political interests, and can produce a variety of responses among
audiences. For some, there is a “withdrawal of emotion and distancing of oneself from the issue”
while for others, irony provokes “emotionally charged and passionate engagement” (Hutcheon
1994:15). Moreover, there is a critical distinction between two types of ironic messages: one
works constructively from within the existing system to articulate new positions and attempt to
change political outcomes. The other type takes an outsider’s point of view to target products of
the system (rather than the system itself) in a more destructive, negativizing way (Hutcheon
1994). News parody, I would argue, works from within the system in the form of subversive
irony, working off of dominant discourses and recognizing power hierarchies. The authors of
these media texts are reflexive and self-critical about its position of relative powerlessness.
In an interview with Rolling Stone magazine, Jon Stewart commented on the popularity
of his show and Stephen Colbert’s, saying, “I’ve always thought that we were somewhat an
expression of people’s dissatisfactions with the existing institutions, rather than our own
success...Everyone overestimates the power of satire…In a lot of ways it’s a catharsis and a
pressure valve. But that’s the difference between being a revolutionary and a satirist” (Bates
2011). Stewart has always contended that his program is intended to be purely comedic
entertainment, and should not be considered journalism or social activism. Yet his passive view
of his own work lacks an awareness of satire’s role in challenging and legitimating the
government order in the age of deliberative democracy. The complexities of ironic discourse
may indeed have considerable effects on social understandings of citizenship and on the
democratic system at large.
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CONCLUSION
The theoretical basis of this study concerns the fragmented and polarized conditions of
the modern society that have led to a crisis of legitimation and destabilized understandings of
democratic citizenship. The preceding discussion recognizes media as the primary platform for
discursive democracy to take place, and asserts the significance of ironic discourses in
relationships of power. Given this foundation, it can be argued that news-style political satire, in
the style Jon Stewart, Stephen Colbert and The Onion, represents Habermas’ ideal of deliberative
discourse. Their comedy serves as an alternative voice in the public discussion of political
matters, which rationalizes the very existence of the United States government and the
legitimacy of its policies.
However, several questions remain. Do these programs encourage citizens to be
participants or spectators? Are they, like most politically-relevant media, designed for the
consumption of information in a style more humorous and entertaining than traditional
journalism, or do they function as critical part of the deliberative democracy, giving people an
alternative lens through which to view the modern social situation?
Most importantly, this study attempts to address the tensions of defining citizenship in the
age of mediated discourse. What type of citizenship is promoted by political satire? Does it
represent freedom from oppression in the liberal model, in which we live private lives and
consume political media which affirms our own beliefs and supports our personal interests? Or
is it a revolutionary citizenship, which effectively challenges the existing order in a public sphere
and provokes political action? The following qualitative and quantitative research will
investigate the civic role of political satire in modern America.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
To explore the effects of news-style political satire on attitudes about citizenship, I
collected data using two separate but interrelated stages. I first conducted a content analysis of
media texts from The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and The Onion in order to determine what
topics were being discussed, and what messages were being presented to audiences regarding
citizenship. The primary concern was whether or not these texts either explicitly or implicitly
promoted a particular Habermasian model of citizenship through their satirical rhetoric. I used
these findings to develop a survey questionnaire that would attempt to measure the how
respondents viewed the relationship between American citizens and their governing institutions.
I ran statistical tests on the survey data to determine if there were patterns in the way that people
who consumed political satire thought about citizenship compared to people who did not. The
following chapter will detail the data collection process for both of these stages.

METHODOLOGY
I chose to use a combination of content analysis and survey collection research methods
primarily for the type of information that could be collected from these two types of
investigation. A systematic analysis of the relevant media texts allows the researcher to infer
what messages are being sent to a mass audience, as well as the possible influences these
messages might have on their receivers. As Ole R. Holsti (1969) explained, one of the principle
purposes of content analysis is “to make inferences as to the effects of communication (the
decoding process) upon the recipient” (p.35). Because the research question is primarily
concerned with latent content (the underlying civic messages that satirical news promotes), this
step was important in establishing what type of citizenship model is reinforced through these
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texts. From there, I was able to hypothesize how engagement with this type of media might
affect the attitudes of its viewers. More practically, content analysis allows for descriptive data to
be collected unobtrusively, fairly simply, and at a low financial cost to the researcher.
The use of survey data in the study’s second phase allowed for the examination of media
consumption habits and civic attitudes of the American electorate by accessing a fairly large,
reliable sample. Using the survey method of data collection through an online task distribution
resource allowed for the study to move beyond the geographical and time limitations of
experimental or interview methods. A large sample that pulled from a national audience was
required for this study in order to be able to make generalizable assertions about the influence of
satirical media messages on a mass audience.
A primary critique of survey data collection techniques is their inherent weaknesses in
validity. The complex attitudinal and behavioral concepts which comprise the dependent
variables in this study are difficult to capture in a standardized questionnaire. Although careful
operationalization was employed to construct quality survey questions, it is important to
recognize that the survey design is weak in concept validity, but strong in reliability. Multiple
measures were used to capture the various dimensions of the term “citizenship” while retaining
applicability for a diverse population.

CONCEPTUALIZATION
The construct of “citizenship” is conceptualized for this study through the use of Jürgen
Habermas’ three theoretical models, which distinguish between “liberal,” “republican,” and
“deliberative” views of citizenship. Indicators of “liberal” citizenship include support for the
ideas of economic/fiscal conservatism, limited government in exchange for expanded individual
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rights, a limited social safety net, and an emphasis on individualism over community welfare. In
the context of elections, voting would be viewed as a form of resistance to a government that has
become overbearing or threatening to individual liberties, and the act of voting would be
referenced as a constitutional right granted to individuals of a certain legal status. The liberal
view is sometimes described as the “freedom from” model, in which political rights are negative
rights and abstinence from participation is considered a valid option. A vote is considered an
indication of approval for a person or program, which when combined with the approving
choices of others, licenses the administration with a particular power.
In contrast, the “republican” model of citizenship frames political rights as positive
liberties that, although representative of autonomous choices, are also symbolic of the
connections the individuals of a society have with one another. There is an emphasis on
inclusion and active interest in each others’ enfranchisement. The republican perspective
advocates for an adequate social safety net—a system that would require heavy taxation of the
nation’s wealthy to support the poor. The act of voting is considered an important responsibility
of the citizen, and should be leveraged to ensure that everyone is protected equally under the law.
Voting may be described within this model as a display of communal behavior, in which people
are inclined to support measures that improve the well-being of everybody within the society
rather than their particular interests. There is an important discursive element to the process of
decision-making, in which acts of deliberation are a chance for every participant to communicate
their interests in order to arrive at a comprehensive model of what is best for the community. A
vote “represents a pooling of judgments” (Habermas, 1998, p.244) based on a mutual
understanding of every position.
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Finally, Habermas’ alternative model of “deliberative” citizenship emphasizes the
negotiation process of democratic decision-making, and calls for the institutionalization of the
discursive procedures of the republican model. However, rather than assuming people make
voting decisions based on thorough consideration of all positions or according to a purely
individual motivation, this model suggests that opinion-formation occurs through informal public
networks. Rather than making the distinctions between particular versus communal interests or
the rights versus responsibilities of citizens, deliberative citizenship instead promotes political
engagement, debate, and participatory discourse within informal networks, with the assumption
that the negotiation of competing interests will eventually lead to a rational, legitimate system of
governance. A vote, in this view, is the exercise of an individual opinion, influenced by public
communication, which is transformed by the administration into public policy.
As described in the previous chapter, these models of citizenship must be evaluated
within the context of media colonization of communicative action. Political mass media texts in
general are important socializing tools Americans use to understand their relationship to the
government and their role as citizens (Davis 1992). According to Habermas, the ways in which
the news media discuss and frame political issues abstracts the political process from the
ordinary American’s personal experience. With the public sphere increasingly mediated—and
with polarized voices claiming to have the “correct” doctrinal worldview—democratic
citizenship becomes less participatory. It has been argued that media texts construct and
rationalize a view of citizenship that is passive, private, self-interested, and cynical (Schudson
1999; Cappella and Jamieson 1997). The role of satirical discourses in constructing worldviews
is more ambiguous, and the way in which these popular texts define citizenship is less clear.
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Using the concepts of Habermas’ normative models of citizenship, I aimed to identify which
definition was present in satirical texts, and in the attitudes of survey respondents.

OPERATIONALIZATION
To determine which model of citizenship was being promoted by the media texts and
which model the survey respondents identified most closely with, two types of measures were
examined: behavioral and attitudinal. Behavioral displays of citizenship comprise of reported
degrees of participation in civic activities and engagement in political issues. Media messages
may encourage viewers to vote, to take activist roles, or simply just to pay attention and to think
critically about current issues. Comedic satire has been shown to direct attention to and increase
engagement with particular issues (Cao 2010), although the behavioral implications are less clear
(see Cao and Brewer 2008; Baumgartner and Morris 2011).
To measure political behavior, respondents were asked if they had registered to vote in
the 2012 election, and if they actually did vote for United States president, members of Congress,
or social issues on the ballot (questions 6-9). They were also asked how often they participated
in the following activities (question 15): discussing or debating political matters with family or
friends; discussing or debating political matters in an online forum; reading books or in-depth
articles on political figures or political issues; watching televised political debates; volunteering
for political campaigns; and participating in political protests. Finally, they were asked to selfrate their level of political engagement (question 14). The survey items were designed to expose
both active and passive engagement behaviors.
Perhaps more illustrative of civic conceptions, however, are attitudinal measures. Based
on the differences between the Habermasian models of liberal, republican, and deliberative
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citizenship, I questioned how people might have rated the relative worth of rights versus
responsibilities in their definition of citizenship, and additionally discover what those particular
rights and responsibilities might be. Survey respondents were asked to rate how important they
thought it was for a “good citizen” to do the following things (question 20): always vote in
elections; stay informed on current political and community issues; help people in the
community who have fewer resources; serve in the military; always obey laws; protect personal
rights; serve jury duty; and pay taxes. In addition, respondents were asked to provide their own
definitions of citizenship (question 19). Answers to this item were coded based on the same
coding criteria used in the content analysis: whether the emphasis was on individual rights or
responsibilities, or else a focus on the legal or social dimension of the concept.
Attitudes of cynicism were also important to this part of the study, as the ironic rhetoric
of political satire has been shown to affect levels institutional trust and feelings of efficacy
(Baumgartner and Morris 2006 and 2011). To measure the perceived health of the relationship
between the government and the individual, survey respondents were asked to rate how much
confidence they had in the groups of people running the national press, their local press, the
federal executive branch, the federal legislative branch, and their local government (question 17).
Efficacy was measured by how strongly they agreed with the following statements (question 18):
U.S. citizens are able to influence national public policy; U.S. citizens are able to influence local
public policy; the political process is controlled by elites; political discourse is dominated by the
mass media; my voice matters in the political conversation. Together, behavioral and attitudinal
indicators of civic thought were analyzed to discover how political satire texts and Americans
defined the complex notion of citizenship.
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CONTENT ANALYSIS
The first phase of data collection was a content analysis of popular, mainstream satirical
texts on the topic of American electoral politics. To best capture the potential influence of satire
on viewer behavior and attitude, the analysis chose from texts released in the days leading up to
the 2012 election when there was likely to be increased attention on citizen participation
(primarily in the form of voting). For both The Daily Show and The Colbert Report, the unit of
analysis was an episode clip, a 1 ½ to 7-minute segment of the show covering a single topic. For
The Onion, a self-contained article or video was the unit of analysis. Video clips and articles
were accessed through the franchises’ respective websites.3 The sample consisted of 20 clips
from The Daily Show, 20 clips from The Colbert Report, and 20 items from The Onion, for a
total of sixty cases. To create a sampling frame, I first listed every relevant clip from the Comedy
Central programs that aired from the time frame of October 8, 2012 through November 6, 2012
(a total of 15 episodes each). It is important to note that this list excluded interview segments
and clips that were not topically focused on politics. Interviews stray from the parodic style of
the rest of the show, and therefore are not the focus of this research. While the vast majority of
remaining clips were about political topics, six clips from The Colbert Report were eliminated
that spotlighted entertainment or cultural topics that were not relevant to the discussion of
politics. The sampling frame for The Onion listed every piece of content (videos and articles)
between October 8, 2012 and November 6, 2012 tagged under “politics.” The sampling frame
consisted of 171 total units (49 from The Daily Show, 44 from The Colbert Report, and 78 from
The Onion.) Twenty samples from each program were chosen at random using Excel’s random
sampling function.

3

www.thedailyshow.com; www.colbertnation.com; www.theonion.com
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Next, to analyze the data, I examined every video clip and article in the sample and coded
it by topic. The coding frame was developed using a primarily inductive method. After viewing
all the samples, a list of common topics was developed. These topics centered around three
primary categories: the campaign itself, issues relevant within the campaign, and the relationship
of citizens to the campaign (primarily in the form of voters). A second phase of analysis was
done on each clip, in which the researcher identified the message that was being delivered. This
involved different strategies for each program; for example, in The Daily Show, Jon Stewart or
his correspondents often ended the segment with a straightforward message that expressed a
morality about the subject matter and the state of the nation more broadly. Stephen Colbert and
The Onion, on the other hand, utilized heavy sarcasm; in such cases, the moral message was
taken to be the opposite of what he said. Ultimately, the coding of the data was subject to the
researcher’s judgment. In a final step of analysis, the moral message was considered within the
theoretical framework of Habermas’ three models of citizenship, and coded accordingly. Units
were coded as “liberal” if they were based on constitutional rights or citizenship as a legal status,
or characterized citizens as private, self-interested, or having a “freedom-from-externalcompulsion” attitude. Clips were labeled “republican” if they focused instead on civic
responsibilities or communal welfare, or suggested that citizenship entailed a “freedom-to-act”
attitude. Portrayals that emphasized the communicatively generated power of individuals were
coded as “deliberative citizenship.” However, because this ideal type is only feasible in a
context where discursive procedures have been institutionalized, there exists a clear conflict in
the real context of media colonization. Deliberative procedures have all but disappeared from
the national political process, but not without critique. Many units were coded, therefore, as “a
critique of media colonization,” which identified in the ways that the political conversation is
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abstracted from the individual by portraying them as ill-informed, easily manipulated, or not
interested in politics. This may be considered an advocate for a shift toward deliberative
democracy. Finally, units that did not appear to present a particular view of citizenship were
coded as “neutral.”

SURVEY COLLECTION
A survey was conducted to test if there existed a correlation between frequent viewing of
The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, or The Onion and conceptions about citizenship. The
surveys questionnaires were distributed via Amazon Mechanical Turk, a program that distributes
small tasks to anonymous “workers” for small compensation. Ross, Irani, Zaldivar, and
Tomlinson (2010) conducted a study that determined that the population of MTurk workers are
“diverse across several notable demographic dimensions such as age, gender, and income, but
[are] not precisely representative of the U.S. as a whole,” citing such factors as education level
and nationality to be more homogenous than desired by many researchers. Additionally, because
this system requires Internet access and English language skills, “Compared to the entire
population, MTurk workers from the U.S. are younger (median age 30 vs. 36.6), much more
highly educated (63% vs. 25% with college degrees), and include a significantly greater number
of female members (69% vs. 51%). Turkers also tend towards lower levels of annual income.”
These demographic concerns were taken into consideration during the construction of this
study’s survey. For control purposes, then, demographic information was collected from each
respondent (age, gender, education level, race, citizenship status).
Tasks on MTurk are distributed in the form of an HIT (“Human Intelligence Task”),
where a description of the survey is posted on the site for workers to choose from among other
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tasks by various requesters. Workers who selected my task were given a link that directed them
to my survey on SurveyGizmo.com. After completion of the survey, workers returned to MTurk
to close the HIT using the same five-digit code entered on the survey site. If their survey
responses were approved (I checked each one for completeness and indications of thoughtfulness
of answers), they would receive the stated compensation (between $0.15-$0.25).
Data from the surveys was collected through SurveyGizmo.com, and converted to an
SPSS data set. I then several statistical tests on the data set, which are discussed in the following
chapter.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
CONTENT ANALYSIS
The political satirist occupies a unique position within the existing newsmaking system, a
position that demands both adherence to certain journalistic conventions and detachment from
the forces that construct Americans’ political reality. These comedians must comment on topical
content in a manner familiar to audiences, but provide alternative interpretations that challenge
the status quo. American citizenship, a compound and malleable concept, might be undergoing
renegotiation within these carnivalesque spaces. In order to form concrete hypotheses about how
political satire viewership might affect individuals’ worldview, I examined popular satirical
texts, asking, what is the definition of citizenship being promoted by contemporary news
parody? For this investigation, I sought to identify which of Jürgen Habermas’ three models of
citizenship (liberal, republican, or deliberative) was predominant within the satirists’ messages.
This section will introduce and explain my findings regarding the topical content of sixty news
parody cases.
Table 1 summarizes the Habermasian model of citizenship represented within these sixty
media texts:
Table 1. Models of Citizenship in Satirical Texts
Type of Citizenship
Liberal
Republican
Deliberative
Neutral
Media colonization

The Daily
Show (n=20)
0
4
0
7
9

The Colbert
Report (n=20)
5
5
0
5
5

The Onion
(n=20)
1
5
0
6
8

Total
(n=60)
6
14
0
18
22

Percentage
of Total
10.0%
23.3%
0.00%
30.0%
36.6%

Approximately one-third of the content offered up a view of citizenship according to one of the
three Habermasian models (the rest either remaining neutral or focusing on media colonization

68
and the lack of deliberative democratic space). Of these, only 30% (10% of the total units)
referred to citizenship in a liberal sense. The legal status of citizens was considered only in
relation to voting rights that need to be protected against various attempts at disenfranchisement.
The expectation that citizens should be private or self-interested was never presented. In
contrast, there was more frequent evidence of the notion of citizens having particular
responsibilities toward their fellow Americans—most often articulated in the form of voting
(voter responsibility was a topic in 10% of total clips).
The majority of the satire units that depicted a Habermasian model were found to be
republican, comprising 23.2% of the total clips. Such a model incorporated a variety of
politicized stances regarding civic duty. On separate occasions, Stephen Colbert stressed the
importance of affirmative action (Oct. 16, 2012), an adequate social safety net to help victims of
disaster (Oct. 31, 2012), increased taxation of the wealthy to contribute to the welfare system
(Oct. 8, 2012), and the potential destructiveness of voting on the basis of particular interests
(Oct. 31, 2012). Colbert, who takes on the persona of a conservative pundit to make his point
utilizing heavy-handed sarcasm, frequently highlights the destructiveness of ideologies that
benefit members of the privileged class (wealthy white males like himself). His recognition of
systemic economic and social inequalities leads many of his comedic statements to be classified
as republican. However, it is interesting to note that The Colbert Report registered the highest
occurrence of liberal units (five). Each of these segments defended a citizen’s legal right to vote
in the face of disenfranchisement, and in once instance, defended the right to abstain from
voting. Yet, the theme of civic responsibility proved to be a stronger message from Stephen
Colbert than did the protection of individual rights.
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Meanwhile, The Onion explored the deleterious social effects of the liberal philosophy of
viewing elections as a system of marketplace interactions. One news brief under the headline
“Increased Negative Campaigning Reveals Previously Hidden Ugly Side of Politics”
(http://www.theonion.com/articles/increased-negative-campaigning-reveals-previously,30182/)
commented that the financial contributions of voters to political campaigns are often used to fund
attack ads and further the development of anti-intellectual and irrational modes of political
discourse. Similar to The Colbert Report, The Onion provided a liberal interpretation of
citizenship only to invoke voting rights in a defense against voter disenfranchisement. The real
essence of citizenship, therefore, lies in recognizing flaws in political and social systems which
promote anti-intellectualism and inequality.
Table 2 presents the distribution of sub-topics found in the satirical texts that related to
the campaign. The results highlight the comedians’ intense focus on the relationship between
mass media and political campaigning.
Table 2. Campaign-Related Topics in Satirical Texts
Campaign-Related
Sub-topics
Presidential politics
Congressional politics
Televised debate
Media spectacle
Media partisanship
Campaign funding/spending
Negative campaigning
Rhetorical hypocrisy
Bribery/corruption
Conspiracy theories
Anti-intellectualism
Political partisanship

The Daily
Show (n=20)
18
1
9
7
9
2
3
5
0
0
3
7

The Colbert
Report
(n=20)
15
2
2
8
8
1
0
2
2
6
4
2

The Onion
(n=20)

Total
(n=60)

Percentage
of Total

16
2
8
9
2
2
2
2
1
0
2
1

49
5
19
24
19
5
5
9
3
6
9
10

82.0%
8.3%
31.7%
40.0%
31.7%
8.3%
8.3%
15.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
16.7%

It is unsurprising that, in the close proximity to the presidential election, 82% of the
parody units were on the topic of presidential politics—defined here as the strategic process of

70
getting a candidate elected to the office of the presidency by influencing the minds of the
electorate. In the contemporary context, presidential politics involves a complex relationship
between politicians, mass media, and voters, which accounts for the high incidence of mediacentric topics identified in the satire. Significantly, 40% of total clips were about media
spectacle—the use of political discourse as a commodity (a source of profit) rather than as a tool
for rational decision-making. Although The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and The Onion sit
alongside mainstream media programs, they offer up a heavy skepticism of the mass media’s
role in constructing Americans’ political and civic reality. News parody programs engage in
“hypermediation” tactics that encourage viewers to scrutinize the source of information, and by
extension, the gatekeeping and mediation activities of the journalism industry (McKain
2005:417).
By frequently mocking the spectacle-making activities of the mass media and pointing
out the consequences of their “style over substance” folly, satirical programs bring awareness to
the ways in which political analysis gets reduced to a superficial discussion of candidates’
demeanor or gaffes at the expense of debate on important policy issues. In one example, a
newsbite-length Onion news item parodied the gratuitous attention given to a politician’s public
performance. Under the headline, “Biden's Handlers Suggesting He Forget the Words ‘Pink’ and
‘Stink’ Altogether” (http://www.theonion.com/articles/bidens-handlers-suggesting-he-forget-thewords-pin,29870/?ref=auto), the piece described political experts giving some ridiculoussounding advice to Joe Biden in preparation for the Vice Presidential debate in October. The
Onion did not simply joke how important it is for a politician to have a good media image (a
universally understood political reality). By presenting the situation in parodic form, it faulted
the mainstream media for reflexively and compulsively discussing the importance of media
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image, and thereby making it that much more important relative to the actual issues of the
candidates’ debate.
In addition to problematizing the media’s spectacle-making, satirical discourses take
issue with news outlets’ increasing partisanship. Nearly one-third of the clips portrayed the mass
media as heavily partisan, and the political information they present as tainted by the media
corporations’ ideological agenda. Fox News is the most heavily criticized news outlet in the
Comedy Central programs, accused by Jon Stewart of spinning their analysis in support of the
GOP, and mocked by Stephen Colbert for advancing political conspiracy theories. Both
comedians frequently criticize conservative pundits for acting petty and immature when they are
clearly on the losing end of an argument. In one example, The Daily Show presented a montage
of Fox News clips airing in the wake of the second presidential debate showing various
conservative pundits accusing the moderator of giving President Obama three extra minutes on
the floor, selecting questions that were “pro-Obama,” and assisting the President by factchecking in the middle of the debate. After the clips, Stewart jokes in a soft paternal voice “Let
them cry themselves to sleep. It’s the only way they’ll learn” (Oct. 17, 2012). He plainly
suggests here that media partisanship promotes childish and anti-intellectual approaches to
political discourse—a problematic condition when the public uses such narratives to construct
their social reality.
To the satirists, media partisanship is further problematic because it plays up a false
narrative that suggests the entire country is deeply and fundamentally partisan. While 16.7% of
the clips discussed the partisanship of the United States government (a condition that is not
disputed), a similarly sizable percentage (18.3%) questioned the assumption that the electorate is
as ideologically divided as professional politicians (see Table 3). In one particular Colbert
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Report segment, the fake newsman mocked the journalists who recoiled against statistician Nate
Silver’s prediction that Obama had an 86% chance of defeating Mitt Romney (Nov. 5, 2012).
Pundits ostracized Silvers’ empirical analysis because it challenged the “agreed-upon narrative”
that the election would be “razor tight” (a narrative that ensured consumer interest in their
product). By mocking the media’s failure to accept empirical facts about the electorate, Colbert
here illuminates the ways in which the news tries to actively construct our reality by telling
viewers what they and their neighbors believe, and how this “reality” is empirically false.
Compared to discussions of politics and citizenship, criticisms of media colonization
dominated the satirists’ discourse, comprising 36.6% of the clips analyzed (see Table 1). This is
likely a function of the programs’ parodic structure, which makes the network and cable news an
easy target. An overarching theme is that the media is harmful to democracy when it takes
discursive power away from the American people. In this way, Stewart, Colbert, and The Onion
can be viewed as believers in a discursive democracy ideal, who endeavor to take away the
influence of journalists and pundits through comedic delegitimation. However, although
deliberative democracy may be the logical opposite of media colonization, there are zero
occurrences in the surveyed clips that actively and directly promote deliberative citizenship.
They prefer to talk about national politics as a mediated field of competing worldviews, rather
than as a collective of individuals, each endowed with communicative power.
Table 3 shows a distribution of sub-topics related broad national political issues—
theoretically, the topics that are discussed by candidates. Notably, these issues are less prevalent
in the satirical texts, and often take a back seat to discussions of media and the campaign.
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Table 3. Political Issues Topics in Satirical Texts
Political Issues
Sub-topics
Religion
Sexual morality
Domestic economy
Foreign Policy
Healthcare
Natural disaster aid

The Daily
Show (n=20)
2
1
5
5
0
0

The Colbert
Report (n=20)
1
2
2
1
0
2

The Onion
(n=20)
2
5
3
1
1
1

Total
(n=60)
5
8
9
7
1
3

Percentage
of Total
8.3%
13.3%
15.0%
11.7%
1.7%
5.0%

The domestic economy was the most frequently discussed topic, followed closely by
sexual morality (which included issues of abortion, adultery, and women’s sexual health). These
are, not surprisingly, some of the more polarizing topics of the campaign, highly representative
of party divisiveness. The satirists point out that, among traditional journalists, there is little
discussion of moderate or alternative positions on any of these topics.
Table 4 shows sub-topics directly related to citizenship and voters, and how often they
occurred in the observed sample.
Table 4. Citizenship and Voter Topics in Satirical Texts
Citizen and Voter
Sub-topics
Citizen Partisanship
Voter disenfranchisement
Voter rights
Voter responsibilities
Citizen voices
Public opinion
Voter demographics
Racial minorities

The Daily
Show (n=20)
5
0
0
3
4
3
2
1

The Colbert
Report
(n=20)
4
2
4
1
1
3
5
1

The Onion
(n=20)

Total
(n=60)

Percentage
of Total

2
1
1
2
5
3
1
1

11
3
5
6
10
9
8
3

18.3%
5.0%
8.0%
10.0%
17.0%
15.0%
13.3.%
5.0%

Only 17% of the satirical clips allowed for the voices of everyday citizens to be featured.
Notably in this sample, The Daily Show presented three comical interviews with groups of
potential voters. In each of these segments, however, their source of democratic power was not
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in their ability to debate and communicate their desires for the future of the nation. Their
“voice” was reduced to a bubble on a ballot—and only as it pertained to their vote for president.
Their individual views on political issues were channeled into a dichotomous choice: which
candidate shared their opinion and would “best” represent their interests. Furthermore, citizens
were regularly lumped into demographic voting blocs—as if their choice for president was
predetermined by their race, gender, or religion. Thus, news parodies sometimes fall victim to
the same conventions of real news narratives, and reify the unequal communicative relationship
between politicians, media, and citizens.

CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS CONSTRUCTION
Despite the degree to which The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and The Onion
lampoon the media’s passive treatment of citizens in relation to political decision-making, they
do little to promote a solution by encouraging people to rejoin the national conversation and
channel their communicative power into their governing bodies. They endeavor to delegitimize
journalists’ communicative authority, but they don’t in turn attempt to legitimize the
communicative power of the people. This conclusion can perhaps be countered by rhetorical
evidence in Stewart and Colbert’s “Rally to Restore Sanity and/or Fear,” which aimed to provide
a venue for everyday citizens to speak out against the communicatively controlling forces of the
polarized mass media. While the discourse surrounding that event in 2010 clearly favored a
move toward deliberative democracy, the same cannot be said of the shows’ content as it
pertained to the 2012 presidential election. Stewart and Colbert failed to let individual citizen
voices be heard to any significant degree in the lead-up to the election. Perhaps the satirists view
the media as too ossified of an institution and too effective at colonizing the conversation when it
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comes to national elections. Or, perhaps, they recognize their own dependence on the media as it
currently stands; the loss of media spectacle would devalue their own product. Their moral
philosophical leanings may be outweighed by their desire to make good comedy.
Elections are often framed as opportunities for citizens to reinforce or redefine the values
they want to see promoted at a national level. Satirists impress to viewers the importance of
critical examination of their sources of political information, and give them strategies for
developing rational conclusions about whom they chose to elect to represent them in
government. They indicate that good citizenship involves being aware of how the media has
colonized the political conversation and challenging their assumptions, narratives, and
persuasion tactics through gatekeeping and misinformation. It also involves making responsible
decisions with your voting power. Ultimately, these satirists suggest that is okay to opt out of
the political process if you find it too inaccessible or corrupt. They imply that, in some cases, the
circumstances of polarity, stalemate, anti-intellectualism, negative campaigning, or elitism are
too entrenched to be changed by voters, who already feel detached from the political process as
spectators of media spectacle rather than participants.
The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and The Onion tend to present a low-efficacy, lowtrust, republican view of citizenship. Based on these conclusions, I developed the following
research hypotheses regarding the relationship between regular consumption of political satire
and civic attitudes:


H1: Frequent consumers of political satire will exhibit lower levels of external efficacy
compared to non-consumers.



H2: Frequent consumers of political satire will exhibit lower levels of trust toward
governing and media institutions than non-consumers.
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H3: Frequent consumers of political satire will exhibit more “republican” definitions of
citizenship, in the Habermasian sense, compared to non-consumers.

These hypotheses were tested using the data collected from survey questionnaires, taken from a
national sample.

SURVEY COLLECTION
210 individuals completed the online survey on SurveyGizmo.com, having accepted it as
a task through Amazon mTurk. Demographic data shows that the sample is fairly evenly
distributed among a variety of variables, but slightly skewed from the national population in
ways predicted by Ross, Irani, Zaldivar, and Tomlinson (2010). Respondents tended to be
younger (Chart 1), concentrated in the 25-34 age range (36.7%). 24.3% were between the ages
of 18-24, 28.6% were between the ages of 35-54, while only 10% were over the age of 55. The
sample contained slightly more females than males (51.7% to 49.3%). The majority of
respondents reported their race as white (81.4%), followed by 9.1% Asian, 6.7% Black, 3.8%
Latino, and 1% Other (Chart 2).
Chart 1. Age Distribution of Survey Respondents
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Chart 2. Race Distribution of Survey Respondents
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The sample is more highly educated than the U.S. population, with the majority having
attended at least some college. Over half of respondents hold a college degree (40% have a
bachelor’s degree, 6.2% have an associate’s degree, and 12% have a graduate degree). Only
13.3% have a high school diploma/GED or attended only some high school:
Chart 3. Education Distribution of Survey Respondents
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99.5% of the sample held United States citizenship, while 79.2% registered to vote in the
2012 election. Most voted for the office of President in the election (77.4%), while 63.5% voted
for a Congress member and 49% voted for a social issue on the ballot.
Many respondents went to the Internet to learn about current events, with 60.5% citing
online news sources (such as digital newspapers, Google News, and CNN.com) as their primary
source of news (Chart 4). 14.3% watched network news programming as their primary news
sources, while 2.4% cited Comedic Programming (The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, The
Onion, or late-night talk shows as their primary source of information:
Chart 4. Primary News Source Distribution of Survey Respondents
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7.4% of people reported learning about current events through comedic programming shows on a
daily basis, while a sizable 20.8% say they get information from those programs several times in
a week. This result is comparable to the 9% of people who cited comedic programming as a
“regular source of campaign information” in a recent study by the Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press (2012a.)
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After data recoding, the proportion of respondents who regularly watched The Daily
Show or The Colbert Report was fairly even. Regular consumers (people who watched this
media daily, several times per week, or several times per month) made up 47.9% of the sample,
compared to 52.1% of those who rarely or never watched the shows. This variable serves as the
primary independent variable throughout the statistical study, representing regular and nonregular consumption of political satire.
In terms of self-reported political affiliation, the sample skewed toward the liberal end of
the spectrum. After recoding a seven-category scale (strongly conservative to strongly liberal)
into three categories (conservative, independent, and liberal), 56% were considered liberal,
compared to only 23% conservative, with 19% being independent (Chart 5).
Chart 5: Political Beliefs Distribution of Survey Respondents
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HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Hypothesis 1: Frequent consumers of political satire will exhibit lower levels of external efficacy
compared to non-consumers.
Respondents were asked how strongly they agreed with five statements designed to
measure external efficacy (whether or not they believe the government is responsive to citizen
demands). Three items were statements of positive efficacy: “U.S. citizens are able to influence
national policy,” “U.S. citizens are able to influence local policy,” “My voice matters in the
political conversation,” while two items were negative statements: “The political process is
controlled by elites” and “Political discourse is dominated by the mass media.” Agreement with
the positive items and disagreement with the negative items indicates high efficacy, while
disagreement with the positive items and agreement with the negative items indicates low
efficacy. I ran crosstabs on each item to see if there was a relationship between frequency of
viewership and their levels of efficacy.
Tables 5 and 6 (see Appendix A) display the relationship between satire consumption and
agreement as to whether U.S. citizens were able to influence public policy at the national and
local levels of government. Although only the later relationship was statistically significant
(p=.011), in general, there was a stronger than expected sense of efficacy among satire viewers
according to the responses to these positive questions. While 57.4% of non-viewers agreed that
U.S. citizens were able to influence local public policy, a remarkable 75% of satire viewers
agreed with the statement. Regular viewers were also less likely to disagree with the statement
(8%) compared to non-viewers (21.3%).
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Table 6. Satire Consumption and Efficacy on Local Public Policy Crosstab

Disagree
U S citizens are able to
Neither Agree nor
influence local public
Disagree
policy
Agree

Total

Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption

Satire Consumption
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
8
23

Total

8.0%

21.3%

14.9%

17

23

40

17.0%

21.3%

19.2%

75

62

137

75.0%

57.4%

65.9%

100

108

208

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

31

Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
9.097a
2
.011
Likelihood Ratio
9.403
2
.009
Linear-by-Linear Association
8.997
1
.003
N of Valid Cases
208
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.90.

Table 7 on the following page displays survey responses to the third positive item. When
asked about their perception of their own communicative power, a relatively low percentage
(30.7%) believed that their voice mattered in the political conversation. Comparing the
responses, 38.8% of consumers agreed with the statement, compared to 23.4% of nonconsumers. Meanwhile, more non-consumers thought their voice did not matter in the political
conversation (45.8%) compared to regular consumers (38.8%). This relationship was
statistically significant (p=.053).
From these two models, we can conclude that within the population, people who watch
political satire on a regular basis are more confident in their ability to influence local government
and in their communicative power than are people who do not consume satirical media.
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Table 7. Satire Consumption and Political Conversation Crosstab

Disagree
My voice matters in the Neither Agree nor
political conversation Disagree
Agree

Total

Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption

Satire Consumption
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
38
49

Total

38.8%

45.8%

42.4%

22

33

55

22.4%

30.8%

26.8%

38

25

63

38.8%

23.4%

30.7%

98

107

205

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%
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Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
5.890
2
.053
Likelihood Ratio
5.916
2
.052
Linear-by-Linear Association
3.567
1
.059
N of Valid Cases
205
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 26.29.

Although responses to the positive items indicated that many people believed they had a
degree of influence over their governing institutions, they tended to agree even more strongly
with the survey’s negative items, reflecting lower levels of external efficacy. Tables 8 and 9 (see
Appendix A) show that 71.0% of total survey respondents thought that the political process was
controlled by elites (Table 8), and 73.2% thought that the media dominated the political
conversation (Table 9). Although the relationships between satire viewership and agreement
with these two items were not statistically significant and cannot be generalized among the
population, it is worth noting that observed relationships also refuted the hypothesis. Despite the
expectation that frequent viewers would be more aware of the media’s massively influential role
in elections, they were actually less likely to agree with the statement that political discourse was
dominated by mass media, as 69.7% of viewers agreed with this statement compared to 76.4% of
non-viewers. The same surprising trend occurred for the survey statement that the political
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process was controlled by elites: 66.0% of regular viewers agreed with the item, compared to
75.7% of non-viewers. Regular viewers thus exhibited higher levels of efficacy on the negative
items, although these relationships were not statistically significant.
In another measure of politically efficacy, I ran crosstabs to see if there was a relationship
between satire consumption and actual voting behaviors. Participation in the electoral process
indicates a degree of efficacy, as people are only likely to vote if they believe that their vote will
have an impact on representative offices, government structure, or public policy. Table 10
shows that satire viewers are significantly more likely to have cast a vote for the office of United
States President in the 2012 election (p=.006); while 86.9% of satire viewers participated in this
vote, only 68.5% of non-viewers did.
Table 10. Satire Consumption and Presidential Vote Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
86
74

Total

Count
160
% within Satire
86.9%
68.5%
77.3%
Consumption
Did you vote for the office
Count
12
33
45
of the United States
No
% within Satire
President in the 2012
12.1%
30.6%
21.7%
Consumption
election?
Count
1
1
2
Don’t know % within Satire
1.0%
0.9%
1.0%
Consumption
Count
99
108
207
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
10.328a
2
.006
Likelihood Ratio
10.700
2
.005
Linear-by-Linear Association
.012
1
.915
N of Valid Cases
207
a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .96.
Yes
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Similarly, Table 11 shows that 73.7% of satire consumers voted for members of the
United States Congress, compared to only 53.7% of non-viewers (p=.011).
Table 11. Satire Consumption and Congressional Vote Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
73
58

Count
% within Satire
73.7%
Consumption
Count
22
Did you vote for members
of United States Congress No
% within Satire
22.2%
in the 2012 election?
Consumption
Count
4
Don’t know % within Satire
4.0%
Consumption
Count
99
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Pearson Chi-Square
8.946a
2
Likelihood Ratio
9.066
2
Linear-by-Linear Association
.731
1
N of Valid Cases
207
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.26.
Yes

Total

131

53.7%

63.3%

43

65

39.8%

31.4%

7

11

6.5%

5.3%

108

207

100.0%

100.0%

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
.011
.011
.393

Together, these two models show that satire viewers were significantly more likely to participate
in national elections than non-viewers, and therefore more likely to actively perform the civic
role of voter.
Based on these results, there was no support for the hypothesis that consumption of
political satire decreased external efficacy. There was some statistical evidence, however, for the
existence of the opposite relationship, as regular viewers were more confident in their ability to
have their voice heard above the noise of political elites and media colonizers in order to
influence their government. They were also more likely to take an active role in the electoral
process, indicating that they felt that their individual vote could make a difference in the political
landscape.
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Hypothesis 2: Frequent consumers of political satire will exhibit lower levels of trust toward
governing and media institutions than non-consumers.
Five survey items were designed to measure institutional confidence, as adopted from
General Social Survey (GSS Cumulative File, 1972-2006). The respondents were asked to rate,
on a three-point scale, how much confidence they had in the following institutions to
competently perform their public role: National Press, Local Press, Federal Executive Branch
(President), Federal Legislative Branch (Congress), and their local government. I ran crosstabs
to measure the relationship between satire consumption and levels of institutional trust.
In general, respondents reported little confidence in any of the institutions to competently
perform their public roles (see Tables 13-17 in Appendix A). Only 8% of respondents said that
they had a great deal of confidence in the National Press (Table 13), 16.8% said that they had a
great deal of confidence in the Federal Executive Branch (Table 15), and 7.5% said that they had
a great deal of confidence in the Federal Legislative Branch (Table 16). In each of the tables, the
same trend is observable, which indicates that the sample’s satire viewers were more likely to
report “a great deal of confidence” in each of the institutions, while non-viewers were more
likely to report “hardly any confidence.” Based on these results, there is no support for the
hypothesis that regular viewers of satire exhibit lower levels of institutional trust compared to
non-viewers. There is some evidence for the existence of the opposite relationship, although
none of the tests were statistically significant and therefore the relationship cannot be generalized
for the population.
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Hypothesis 3: Frequent consumers of political satire will exhibit more “republican” definitions
of citizenship, in the Habermasian sense, compared to non-consumers.
Several survey items were designed to give an indication of the respondent’s
conceptualization of citizenship, particularly as they defined the term in accordance to the
Habermasian models described in earlier chapters. One open-ended survey question asked
respondents to provide their own definition of citizenship, which was coded to correlate with one
of the three models based on their use of such concepts as “legality,” “membership,” and
“nationality” (liberal citizenship) or “responsibility,” “participation,” and “loyalty” (republican
citizenship).
Table 18 shows the frequencies with which each model appeared in survey respondents’
open-ended descriptions. Note that no answers qualified as “deliberative,” and thus that model
was dropped from subsequent statistical tests. The majority (54.9%) gave definitions within the
liberal model, while nearly a quarter of responses (25.1%) were republican in nature. 20% were
a combination of both liberal and republican definitions.
Table 18. Frequency Distribution of Habermasian Model of Citizenship
Frequency
Percent Valid Percent
Liberal
107
51.0
54.9
Republican
49
23.3
25.1
Valid
Both Liberal & Republican
39
18.6
20.0
Total
195
92.9
100.0
Missing System
15
7.1
Total
210
100.0

Cumulative Percent
54.9
80.0
100.0

I then ran a regression on the two primary models of citizenship, to determine what variables are
most likely to predict adherence to a particular model. The independent variables examined
were political affiliation, race, education, gender, age, and satire consumption. The results are
shown in Table 19 on the following page.
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Table 19. Regression on Predictors of Liberal Citizenship
Model Summary
Model
R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of the Estimate
1
.302a
.091
.061
.48419
a. Predictors: (Constant), How would you describe your political beliefs?, What is your race? White/Other, What is
the highest level of education you have completed?, What is your gender?, What is your age?, About how often do
you watch full episodes or clips from The Daily Show or The Colbert Report?
Coefficientsa
Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

B
(Constant)
597.059
About how often do you
watch full episodes or clips
-.116
from The Daily Show or The
Colbert Report?
What is your age?
.093
What is your gender?
-.011
1
What is your race?
.146
White/Other
What is the highest level of
education you have
.015
completed?
How would you describe your
-.040
political beliefs?
a. Dependent Variable: LiberalCitizenship

Std. Error
822.265

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.

.726

.469

.033

-.268

-3.489

.001

.040
.075

.175
-.011

2.302
-.146

.022
.884

.102

.107

1.435

.153

.025

.042

.587

.558

.021

-.141

-1.865

.064

The adjusted r-squared value in Table 14 indicates that 6.1% of the variance in adherence to a
liberal model of citizenship is explained by the combined variables of age, gender, race,
education, political beliefs, and satire consumption. The relationship between level of satire
consumption and liberal definitions of citizenship is statistically significant (p=.001), with an
increase in viewing frequency corresponding to a decrease in the likelihood of belief in the
liberal model of citizenship. This finding supports the hypothesis that viewership would
correspond with more republican views of citizenship. The only other significant predictor was
age, with an increase in age corresponding to an increased likelihood of providing a liberal
definition.
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Table 20 shows a regression using the same independent variables as predictors of
republican citizenship. Combined, satire consumption, age, gender, race, education, and political
affiliation account for 9% of the variation in adherence to the republican model.
Table 20. Regression on Predictors of Republican Citizenship
Model Summary
Model
R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of the Estimate
1
.201a
.040
.009
.43455
a. Predictors: (Constant), How would you describe your political beliefs?, What is your race? White/Other, What is
the highest level of education you have completed?, What is your gender?, What is your age?, About how often do
you watch full episodes or clips from The Daily Show or The Colbert Report?
Coefficientsa
Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

B
(Constant)
340.665
About how often do you
watch full episodes or clips
.038
from The Daily Show or The
Colbert Report?
What is your age?
-.083
What is your gender?
.004
1
What is your race?
-.065
White/Other
What is the highest level of
education you have
-.012
completed?
How would you describe your
.019
political beliefs?
a. Dependent Variable: RepublicanCitizenship

Std. Error
737.959

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.

.462

.645

.030

.101

1.274

.204

.036
.068

-.180
.005

-2.303
.061

.022
.951

.091

-.055

-.714

.476

.022

-.041

-.550

.583

.019

.079

1.017

.310

In comparison, satirical consumption is less predictive of belief in the republican model. As
hypothesized, the relationship between satire consumption and belief in a republican model is
positive, although not statistically significant (p=.204). Again, age provides a significant
predictor (p=.022) of republican definitions, with an increase in age corresponding to a decrease
in likelihood of have a republican conception of citizenship. The lack of significant findings
could be a function of the small number of republican definitions provided (49).
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To further investigate the relationship between respondents’ satire consumption and
definitions of citizenship, I ran a crosstab and chi-square test:
Table 21. Habermasian Model of Citizenship by Satire Consumption Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
41
65
106
Liberal
% within Satire
44.1%
64.4%
54.6%
Consumption
Count
27
22
49
Habermasian model of
Republican
% within Satire
citizenship
29.0%
21.8%
25.3%
Consumption
Count
25
14
39
Both Liberal &
%
within
Satire
Republican
26.9%
13.9%
20.1%
Consumption
Count
93
101
194
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
8.732a
2
.013
Likelihood Ratio
8.808
2
.012
Linear-by-Linear Association
7.769
1
.005
N of Valid Cases
194
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.70.

As expected, regular viewers of satire were more likely to agree with the republican model than
non-viewers (29.0% compared to 21.8%), while non-viewers were more likely to ascribe to the
liberal model than viewers (64.4% compared to 44.1%). Also notable, a much greater
percentage of regular viewers provided mixed liberal and republican definitions of citizenship
(26.9% compared to 13.9% of non-viewers), suggesting that regular viewers gave more nuanced
explanations which included elements of both models. The results of the chi-square test reveal a
statistically significant relationship between the variables (p=.013), allowing us to reject the null
hypothesis in support of the research hypothesis.
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Because the sample contained a large percentage of people who identified as politically
liberal, I introduced the control variable of political party, which was recoded into three
categories from the original seven-category scale (Table 22).
Table 22. Habermasian Model of Citizenship by Satire Consumption, Controlling for Political Affiliation (3
parties) Crosstab
Political Affiliation (3 parties)
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
3
14
17
Liberal
% within Satire
21.4%
50.0%
40.5%
Consumption
Count
7
8
15
Habermasian
model of
Republican
% within Satire
50.0%
28.6%
35.7%
citizenship
Consumption
Conservative
Count
4
6
10
Both Liberal &
%
within
Satire
Republican
28.6%
21.4%
23.8%
Consumption
Count
14
28
42
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Count
7
17
24
Liberal
% within Satire
53.8%
73.9%
66.7%
Consumption
Habermasian
Count
3
1
4
model of
Republican
% within Satire
23.1%
4.3%
11.1%
citizenship
Consumption
Independent
Count
3
5
8
Both Liberal &
% within Satire
Republican
23.1%
21.7%
22.2%
Consumption
Count
13
23
36
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Count
31
33
64
Liberal
% within Satire
47.7%
68.8%
56.6%
Consumption
Habermasian
Count
16
13
29
model of
Republican
% within Satire
24.6%
27.1%
25.7%
citizenship
Consumption
Liberal
Count
18
2
20
Both Liberal &
% within Satire
Republican
27.7%
4.2%
17.7%
Consumption
Count
65
48
113
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Count
41
64
105
Habermasian
Liberal
% within Satire
Total
model of
44.6%
64.6%
55.0%
Consumption
citizenship
Republican
Count
26
22
48
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Both Liberal &
Republican
Total

% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption

28.3%

22.2%

25.1%

25

13

38

27.2%

13.1%

19.9%

92

99

191

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Political Affiliation (3 parties)
Value
df
Pearson Chi-Square
3.282b
2
Likelihood Ratio
3.435
2
Conservative
Linear-by-Linear Association
1.238
1
N of Valid Cases
42
Pearson Chi-Square
3.130c
2
Likelihood Ratio
3.034
2
Independent
Linear-by-Linear Association
.277
1
N of Valid Cases
36
Pearson Chi-Square
10.861d
2
Likelihood Ratio
12.529
2
Liberal
Linear-by-Linear Association
10.327
1
N of Valid Cases
113
Pearson Chi-Square
8.916a
2
Likelihood Ratio
9.011
2
Total
Linear-by-Linear Association
8.322
1
N of Valid Cases
191
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.30.
b. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.33.
c. 3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.44.
d. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.50.

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
.194
.179
.266
.209
.219
.598
.004
.002
.001
.012
.011
.004

The original relationship was maintained for people who considered themselves conservative or
independent, although these results were not statistically significant due to small sample size
(note that many cells contain fewer than five cases). 66.7% of Independents exhibited liberal
definitions of citizenship, with Independent non-viewers incredibly likely to give liberal
definitions (73.9%). The same trend occurs among political conservatives: 50% of conservative
non-consumers have liberal conceptions of citizenship, while 21.4% of conservative consumers
have liberal conceptions. Meanwhile, 50% of conservative consumers exhibited republican
conceptions of citizenship compared to 28.6% of conservative non-consumers.
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For people who placed themselves at the liberal end of the political spectrum, satire
viewers were slightly less likely than non-viewers to give republican definitions of citizenship
(24.6% compared to 27.1%). Nearly half (47.7%) of frequent viewers gave citizen definitions in
line with the liberal model, compared with 68.8% of non-viewers—a difference of 21.1%.
Notably, only 4.2% of liberal non-viewers provided definitions that were both liberal and
republican, compared with 27.7% of liberal viewers. The chi-squared results show that the
relationship between satirical consumption and citizenship model are significant only for those
who identified on the liberal end of the political spectrum. Based on these results, we can
conclude that satire viewership is only predictive of citizenship conceptions for people who are
politically liberal, with viewership more likely to reflect nuanced definitions of citizenship which
incorporate both of the polarized models.
In addition to the survey item that asked respondents to provide their own definition of
citizenship, I measured civic attitudes by asking respondents how important they thought it was
for a citizen to enact a variety of behaviors. Several items invoked republican duties (always
vote in elections; help people in the community who have fewer resources; serve in the military;
always obey laws; serve jury duty; pay taxes), while one item directly addressed liberal rights
(protect personal rights), and one invoked a necessity of deliberative democracy (stay informed
on current political and community issues). I ran crosstabs on each item to measure the
relationship between satire consumption and these specific civic values. Four relationships had
statistical significance (p<.05), each indicating that regular consumers of satire were more likely
to view republican responsibilities and political knowledge as important aspects of citizenship.
Table 23 shows that 69% of satire viewers indicated that always voting in elections is
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“very important,” compared to 45% of non-viewers. Non-viewers were more likely than viewers
to say that always voting was “not at all important” (15.6% compared to 5%).
Table 23. Satire Consumption and Importance of Voting Crosstab

Always vote in elections: Very important
There are different
opinions as to what it
takes to be a good citizen Somewhat important
How important is it for a
citizen to do the
following things?
Not important at all

Total

Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption

Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
69
49
118
69.0%

45.0%

56.5%

26

43

69

26.0%

39.4%

33.0%

5

17

22

5.0%

15.6%

10.5%

100

109

209

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
13.762a
2
.001
Likelihood Ratio
14.167
2
.001
Linear-by-Linear Association
13.574
1
.000
N of Valid Cases
209
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.53.

Similarly, satire consumers were more likely than non-consumers to believe that helping
others in their community with fewer resources as “very important” (61.6% compared to 38.5%),
while non-viewers were more likely to say it was “not at all important” (13.8% compared to 2%).
The results are displayed in Table 25. Additionally, Table 30 shows that 75% of satire viewers
believed that paying taxes was very important, compared to 56.9% of non-viewers; 10.1% of
non-viewers did not think that this financial contribution was important, compared to 1% of
viewers.
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Table 25. Satire Consumption and Importance of Charity Crosstab

Help people in the
Very important
community who have
fewer resources: There
are different opinions as
to what it takes to be a Somewhat important
good citizen. How
important is it for a
citizen to do the
Not important at all
following things?
Total

Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption

Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
61
42
103
61.6%

38.5%

49.5%

36

52

88

36.4%

47.7%

42.3%

2

15

17

2.0%

13.8%

8.2%

99

109

208

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
15.911a
2
.000
Likelihood Ratio
17.221
2
.000
Linear-by-Linear Association
15.424
1
.000
N of Valid Cases
208
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.09.

Table 30: Satire Consumption and Importance of Paying Taxes Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
76
62
138
Very important
% within Satire
76.0%
56.9%
66.0%
Pay taxes: There are
Consumption
different opinions as to
Count
23
36
59
what it takes to be a good
Somewhat important % within Satire
citizen. How important is
23.0%
33.0%
28.2%
Consumption
it for a citizen to do the
Count
1
11
12
following things?
Not important at all % within Satire
1.0%
10.1%
5.7%
Consumption
Count
100
109
209
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
12.253a
2
.002
Likelihood Ratio
13.675
2
.001
Linear-by-Linear Association
11.661
1
.001
N of Valid Cases
209
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.74.
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Also notable, more satire viewers thought that good citizenship involved staying
informed on political and community issues (Table 24). 61.2% of viewers rated it as very
important (compared to 45.9% of non-viewers), while 11.0% of non-viewers did not think it was
important at all (compared to 0% of viewers).
Table 24. Satire Consumption and Importance of Staying Informed Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
60
50
110
Stay informed on current Very important
% within Satire
61.2%
45.9%
53.1%
political and community
Consumption
issues: There are different
Count
38
47
85
opinions as to what it
Somewhat important % within Satire
takes to be a good citizen.
38.8%
43.1%
41.1%
Consumption
How important is it for a
Count
0
12
12
citizen to do the
Not important at all % within Satire
following things?
0.0%
11.0%
5.8%
Consumption
Count
98
109
207
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
13.315a
2
.001
Likelihood Ratio
17.916
2
.000
Linear-by-Linear Association
9.772
1
.002
N of Valid Cases
207
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.68.

The above results show that regular viewers of political satire were more likely than non-viewers
to think that responsibilities of the republican model were important, further supporting the
hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
Statistical analysis of survey responses revealed three important conclusions about people
who regularly consume news parody. Satire viewers displayed higher levels of external political
efficacy, defined as their perceived ability to exert influence on their governing structures,
compared to non-viewers. Satire viewership did not significantly correlate with levels of
confidence in government or media institutions. Finally, satire viewers were more likely than
non-viewers to define citizenship in the republican sense, emphasizing the connections and
responsibilities toward members of the same political communities. The following chapter will
discuss why these patterns may have emerged from the data. It will connect the results with
earlier literature and theory, while introducing some original insights about the role of political
satire in the social lives of American citizens.

EFFICACY
The observed positive correlation between consumption of news-style political satire and
feelings of efficacy suggests that The Daily Show and The Colbert Report do not breed cynical
citizens in the manner that Baumgartner and Morris (2006, 2011) described. In fact, people who
watch these programs on a regular basis were found to be more likely to believe in the ability of
U.S. citizens to influence public policy and have their own voices included in the political
conversation. Despite the shows’ regular themes of political elitism, media manipulation, and
citizen disenfranchisement, viewers felt that they were still able to make a difference in national
and local politics.
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These results perhaps speak to what type of person is the typical satire consumer: a
demographic study of news show audiences by the Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press (2012c) reports that Daily Show and Colbert Report viewers tend to be under the age of 30,
male, college-educated, and in a higher income bracket than the average American news
consumer. Any combination of these factors could account for higher levels of political efficacy.
In a society where young white educated males are more likely than other groups to engage in
mainstream politics, they are also more likely to benefit from their political engagement in terms
of successfully earning legislative support for their particular interests. Satire viewers also lean
disproportionately towards one end of the political spectrum: Democrats make up 45% of the
audiences of both The Daily Show and The Colbert Report, while only 10% and 12% of their
respective audiences are Republican (Pew 2012c). In the wake of a Presidential election in
which the populist Democratic candidate was victorious, it is likely that Democratic-voting
citizens were feeling more responsible for their candidate’s political success and were
experiencing an inflated sense of efficacy. The observed patterns may have been less significant
if the survey had been conducted at a different point in time, perhaps after a Republican political
victory or during a neutral time in the election cycle, when feelings of efficacy might drop
among the Democrats who make up the majority of the satire audience.
Additional results from this survey show that political satire viewers are significantly
more likely to have cast a vote for President and members of Congress in the 2012 election. This
finding supports some of the previous literature that revealed a positive correlation between
satire viewership and politically active behaviors such as attending campaign events, joining
political organizations (Cao and Brewer 2008) and participating in political discussions (Young
and Esralew 2011). Again, we cannot assume that watching politically-topical comedy programs
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causes increased political engagement and participation, but we can again revisit the theoretical
explainations proposed by these researchers. Cao and Brewer (2008:97) propose that satire
might raise internal efficacy, induce anxiety which sparks political action, or create positive
shared experiences that lead to further participation. Further, Young and Esralew (2011) found
that political knowledge was not a mediating factor between satire consumption and political
participation, which suggests that the messages absorbed from watching satire likely have a
strong effect on an individual’s political behavior regardless of prior knowledge or information
learned from other sources. Based on the results of the current study, there appears to be a strong
relationship between satire viewership, external efficacy, and the likelihood of voting in
elections.
The correlation between satire viewership, feelings of efficacy and voting behavior
indicates that this type of discourse does not discourage political participation among groups of
people who are already likely to be politically engaged. In this sense, the texts help to rationalize
the existing relationship between citizens and government for this group of people. The very
existence of alternative media discourses gives citizens a sense of resistance against the
colonizing forces of the mass media, and the feeling that it is possible to take control of how the
government and media interact to construct our social reality. Although the United States is far
from Habermas’ ideal of deliberative democracy, in which policy decisions are rationalized
when every person exercises their communicative power in the debate, political satire serves as a
place-holder, and perhaps as a catalyst encouraging participation. The comedians use their own
communicative power to challenge the dominant media narratives and suggest that it is
possible—and necessary—for ordinary Americans to do the same.
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INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE
Similar to that of efficacy, the consumption of political satire correlated with an increased
confidence in the people in charge of government and mass media institutions to perform their
jobs competently. On the surface, this result is quite surprising, considering how regularly these
media texts use government and journalistic incompetence as the source of mockery. Although
this relationship was not significant and cannot be generalized for the population, we can again
attempt to explain the unanticipated finding by considering the type of person who is regularly
consuming news parody. Because frequent viewers are likely to be more informed and engaged
in political processes compared to other types of news audiences and therefore have a greater
understanding of the complex systems of representative government, they may transfer their
sense of internal efficacy to confidence in the governing institutions that represent them. In other
words, if individuals consider themselves knowledgeable about the political realm and competent
in their role as an actively engaged citizen, they may also believe that the people whom they
have elected to represent them are competent in their public roles.
As for satire viewers’ increased confidence in the press, it stands to reason that people
who regularly use mass media to learn political information are more likely to report that they
trust their sources; otherwise, they would not watch or read the news. Viewers of political satire,
although regularly exposed to the ideas of media-constructed narratives and numerous instances
of misinformation, are probably not going to be deterred from seeking political information
through mediated texts. Thus, they will report higher levels of trust in the press as part of their
attempt to legitimize the information they have received and rationalize the political reality it has
helped them construct. (Note, however, that the lack of significance associated with this finding
limits our ability to apply this conclusion to the general population of satire viewers.) There is
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an important difference between this audience and audiences of “real” news programs (as will be
discussed later in this chapter), which lies in their fine-tuned ability to deconstruct media
narratives and maintain a healthy skepticism against their information sources rather than
passively accepting any intrinsic factuality of mediated information.
Thus, political satire serves a legitimating function, even for the institutions that it mocks.
By co-opting the journalistic conventions of the nightly news, cable news programs, and print
newspapers, The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and The Onion are reasserting the importance
of those media texts for the health of American democracy. Despite the fact that the mass media
has largely colonized the political discourse in the country and created a potentially dangerous
situation, the press remains a critical connection between governing bodies and ordinary citizens.
As an alternative discourse, new parody works to mitigate some of these dangers, while at the
same time legitimating the press’ core purpose by boosting viewer’s faith in mediated political
information.

CITIZENSHIP
Survey takers overwhelmingly defined citizenship as a legal status in accordance with the
liberal model. To reside in America and possess the right to vote in one’s own interest remains
the overarching sense of the concept, in line with the nation’s cultural values of individualism
and preserving personal liberties. Despite the modern expansion of the welfare state and
growing global emphasis on social rights, American citizenship remains tied to its historical
roots in the “private space,” valuing the autonomy of the individual over ties to the collective
(Turner 1990).
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Although news parody is growing in popularity, it remains appealing to a niche audience,
a fact that perhaps reinforces the very fragmentation of contemporary society. If we think about
fake news as just one of the many choices of information sources available in today’s diverse
media landscape, then preference for satirical news can cement feelings of individuality and
egoism. If the “public arena” is understood in America as “individual involvement in local
voluntary associations” (Turner 1990:209), we may to conceptualize the choice to watch political
satire as membership in a type of voluntary association. The audience of The Daily Show (or any
other politically-centered television program) is a collective of like-minded media consumers
who “participate” in politics through viewership. And because television viewership is a private,
individual act, satire consumers are unlikely to think about citizenship in terms of their civic
relationship with others (as in the republican model).
Such an explanation may account for the fact that the sample as a whole, including satire
consumers, was more likely to display liberal conceptions of citizenship over republican ones.
Despite individual participation in this voluntary association, however, regular viewers of satire
were more likely to talk about civic responsibilities and their social dependency on their
neighbors—a relationship that was not explained by political party affiliation. In fact, politically
conservative and independent satire viewers were slightly more likely than both liberal viewers
and non-viewers to ascribe to the republican model of citizenship. This suggests that satirical
messages that stress civic responsibility may have a greater influence on people who do not share
the same political views as the comedians tend to espouse.4
In this study, there was significant support for the hypothesis that political satire
promotes a republican conception of American citizenship by stressing civic duty and the
4

Both Stewart and Colbert have made it known that they lean democratic, although Teten (2011-2012) argues
through a content analysis that the public perception that The Daily Show is “left-leaning” is a misnomer, as the
show tends to skewer both sides to a fairly equal extent.
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importance of political engagement as a way to uphold the traditional values of the country.
Habermas (1998) believed that in the republican model, politics was considered part of the
socialization process, the medium through which individuals become aware of their mutual
dependence on one another (p.240). To be legitimate, the society based on republican
citizenship requires a sphere of political discourse that is oriented toward creating mutual
understandings of the social world and allow us to work together as a functional community.
The mass media indeed serves that role, whether it is in the form of “real” journalism or satirical
mocking of the administration’s shortcomings. The fake news creates a mutual understanding of
what it means to be a citizen, even when it draws those definitions from a spirit of cynicism.
Most importantly, it tells viewers to be keenly aware of every public relationship they have in
this world, whether it is with business partners, with neighbors, with policy makers, or with
information sources. Individuals can maintain their private interests and civic rights while
recognizing their co-dependencies with fellow citizens. The government, therefore, is seen as a
legitimate form of social control because the process of political will-formation is designed to
suit the common interest.
It is also important to note the absence of Habermas’ ideal form of deliberative
democracy in both the content of political satire and in the open definitions of survey
respondents. It is evident that the competition between doctrinal worldviews suffocates the
negotiation of plural interests through communicative action. It is not difficult to see how the
media has colonized the political conversation in the presence of the four social conditions laid
out by Habermas, which has effectively abstracted the average individual from the political
process. The low levels of external efficacy and confidence in governing institutions across the
board makes it clear that Americans feel significantly less involved in politics than if deliberative
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democracy was enacted which would allow every voice to participate in the rational decisionmaking process.
Because deliberative power is in the hands of the mass media, most political journalism
texts construct a view of citizenship that casts public individuals as participants in the selfinterested group bargaining sessions. In the news narratives, particularly around election season,
citizens are talked about as party members, candidate supporters, or at the very least, voters who
will have to ultimately pick a side. To some extent, the satirical texts are guilty of the same
characterization, as discovered in this study’s content analysis. This conception is rational, but
problematic when partisan interests do not accurately or completely meet the needs of the entire,
fragmented community.
Fake news programs are also unable to represent the interests of every citizen who is not
accounted for in the partisan debate. However, they do serve as a proxy, to remind us that
alternative voices do exist, and by increasing their visibility, we are able to come to more rational
decisions regarding legislative acts. The “Rally to Restore Sanity and/or Fear” is perhaps the
ultimate attempt by the comedians’ to add more discursive voices to the political conversation
and to invigorate a more deliberative decision-making process. Political satire attempts to
coordinate social understanding not via the tenets of capitalism (information as a source of
profit), but via the potential communicative power of individuals.

A MORE COMPELLING, COMPLEX INFORMATION SOURCE?
A typical newscast or newspaper delivers information on current events in a particular
manner that is specifically constructed to eliminate bias and increase objectivity. Whether those
ideals are achieved or not is clearly debatable, but a resolution is not necessary to this discussion.
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What is important is the way in which the news constructs the role of citizen in relation to the
government, and how that conception might be challenged by the media that parody it. I argue
that a primary difference between “real” and “fake” news is the level of cognitive engagement
each demands from its viewers. Conventionally, “real” journalism provides information in the
form of superficial facts presented without editorial, which is expected to be absorbed into the
consciousness of the consumer without any analytic concerns. In contrast, Stewart, Colbert and
The Onion ask viewers to engage with the topic at hand, encouraging them to think critically
about the consequences of government action and the relationship that every individual person
has to their governing institutions.
Perhaps this is one explanation for the optimism of satire viewers. Michael Schudson
(1999) argued that audiences of network and cable news are pessimistic about the state of our
union because political reporting is filtered through a cynical press corps. Journalists, he
believes, are growing increasingly contemptuous of authority, while at the same time pandering
to audiences by appealing to the least common denominator. So while the mainstream press has
largely failed to properly educate the electorate on complex issues of politics, the fake news has
provided alternative narratives that encourage viewers to explore and try to understand the
complexity of a government system that they cannot directly experience. Although the comedic
anchors express cynicism about the competency of the people running these institutions, their
ability to abandon conventions of objectivity leaves open a space for shades of grey. Most
critically, they encourage a more systematic view of social problems (e.g. rigid structures of
inequality and the lack of progressiveness in partisan ideologies), rather than simply blaming the
people at the top.
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Furthermore, by hosting interviews with both top political figures and analysts from a
variety of academic fields, the satirists frame the actions of individual leaders within a larger
political, economic, and social framework. Instead of learning about the day’s events as a series
of isolated news items, viewers are given a chance to make connections between the actions of
the institutions that govern them and the world they also personally experience. Parody is, as
Robert Hariman (2008) believes, bringing political discourse closer to the audience’s experience
and thus giving them a greater sense of civic connection. If the real news abstracts individuals
from the political realm, as Habermas argues in his theory of media colonization, the fake news
may serve re-integrating functions to give them a stronger sense of civic duty.
Similarly, while the mainstream narratives highlight conflict among political elites,
effectively reducing viewers’ faith in their government (Cappella and Jameison 1997), satirical
narratives caution their viewers not to buy into those narratives. Instead, they expose the very
constructedness of the news and leave open the possibility that our leaders are, in fact, competent
and trustworthy, even though we can poke fun at them. The mainstream media’s insistence on
emphasizing partisanship leads to a worldview in which particular social circumstances are
entrenched and virtually unchangeable due to the stubbornness of party ideologies. When this
notion is ironically deconstructed, and we are shown the larger picture in which social
circumstances are always negotiable, we see the possibilities for transformation.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
It may be somewhat ironic that my hypothesis, which guessed that political satire was
ultimately harmful to democracy based on the ways that it might increase cynicism and attitudes
of ironic detachment from society, was cynical in its very nature. I myself am I regular viewer of
the Comedy Central programs and frequent visitor to The Onion’s website, where I indeed learn
about things happening in Washington and around the world in a manner that I find humorous
and highly engaging. Although I often find myself feeling somewhat downtrodden after
consuming this kind of media (a feeling often summed up in the incredulous or defeated looks
Jon Stewart gives the camera at the end of a segment about the absurd behaviors of our nation’s
political leaders), I now understand that these types of shows have given me certain tools for
navigating my socio-political world that viewers of a typical broadcast might not have. Through
this brand of comedy, I have learned the value of skepticism, grown to feel connected to the
community of viewers, developed a stronger awareness of how government action relates to my
own life, and found enjoyment in the process of gathering political information. Through the
writing of this thesis, I have grown to see the ways in which political satire can be empowering
and can make valuable contributions to a healthy democracy. Perhaps counter-intuitively, news
parody counteracts anti-intellectual trends in news media by adding complexity. Further, the
genre can demystify political processes and make them more accessible to the average American.
Additional research on this topic should continue to examine the specific ways in which
ironic and humorous discourses shape political engagement, and in what contexts the messages
of political satire might be more impactful on an audience. It should further investigate
mediating factors that may be able to explain or refute the conclusion that political satire creates
a more informed, engaged, analytical, confident, or community-oriented citizen. Finally, it
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should more thoroughly analyze the content of contemporary political satire as it reacts to
ongoing trends in political journalism and mass media more generally.
As Geoffrey Baym discussed, political comedy is not merely an example of the ways
information and entertainment content are being conflated in contemporary media practices.
Rather, it is an innovative way of “speaking about, understanding, and acting within the world
defined by the permeability of form and the fluidity of content” (2006:262). The “fake news”
genre plays with the informational content and delivery in a way that allows ordinary citizens to
see themselves as part of a political system that operates on communicative action. It promotes
the notion that dialogue must serve as the “locus of democracy,” where citizens determine their
preferences as private citizens and define their political will with an orientation toward the public
interest (p.273). Ultimately, this study supports Baym’s argument that news parody, when
performed successfully, has discursively integrative functions that are critical in modern
American political society.
An increased sociological focus on modern political journalistic practices and news
parody is important for understanding how various discourses affect individuals’ worldviews as
well as systems of social organization. On the issue of structural legitimation in the face of
social fragmentation, we can see that alternative political discourses actually help create more
trusting worldviews and strengthen political communities. Satire legitimates existing
organizational structures while suggesting ways it might be modified to better serve the
populace. In a society characterized by fragmentation and risk, political communities and
conceptions of citizenship are being redefined. Whereas political communities used to be
created, sustained, and rationalized through civic discourse between neighbors, new media
technologies are pushing debate outside the face-to-face public sphere and into a virtual space
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where it is steered by media industry and political elites. Satire’s social function lies not simply
in its attempt to keep our nation’s leaders honest and attuned to citizen concerns. It also
socializes citizens to participate in the democratic process by encouraging them to re-engage
with the political discourse, develop rational opinions about political issues, and grow to see the
society’s organizational structures as legitimate forms of social control. Most importantly, it
inspires optimism, by suggesting that our country’s social problems can be solved through
government action if we continue to challenge the status quo and push for more democratic
modes of discourse.
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APPENDIX A: SAMPLE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Demographics
1) What is your age?*
( ) under 18
( ) 18-24
( ) 25-34
( ) 35-54
( ) 55+
2) What is your gender?
( ) Male
( ) Female
3) What is the highest level of education you have completed?*
( ) Some high school
( ) High school/GED
( ) Some college
( ) Associate's degree
( ) Bachelor's degree
( ) Master's degree
( ) Doctorate degree
( ) Law degree
( ) Medical degree
( ) Trade or other technical school degree
4) What is your race?
[ ] White
[ ] Black
[ ] Latino
[ ] Asian
[ ] Other race
[ ] Prefer not to answer
5) Are you a United States citizen?*
( ) Yes
( ) No

Voting
6) Did you register to vote in the 2012 election?
( ) Yes
( ) No
( ) Don't know
7) Did you vote for the office of the United States President in the 2012 election?
( ) Yes
( ) No
( ) Don't know
8) Did you vote for members of United States Congress in the 2012 election?
( ) Yes
( ) No
( ) Don't know
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9) Did you vote on any social issues on the ballot in the 2012 election?
( ) Yes
( ) No
( ) Don't know

News
10) How often do you learn about current events from the following outlets?
Several days
Several days
Daily
per week
per month
Print newspaper (e.g. The
()
()
()
New York Times, USA
Today, The Daily Record)

Rarely

Never

()

()

Network news programs
(e.g. ABC's Good Morning
America, NBC's Nightly
News, local news
broadcasts)

()

()

()

()

()

Cable news programs
(CNN's Anderson Cooper
360, MSNBC's The Rachel
Maddow Show, FoxNews'
Fox and Friends)

()

()

()

()

()

Radio programs (NPR,
national or local talk radio)

()

()

()

()

()

Online news source (e.g.
digital newspapers, Google
News, CNN.com)

()

()

()

()

()

Political blog (e.g. Daily
Kos, The Huffington Post,
Little Green Footballs)
Comedic programming
(The Daily Show, The
Colbert Report, The
Onion, late-night talk
shows)

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

11) Which of the following is your primary source of news?
( ) Print newspaper
( ) Network news program
( ) Cable news program
( ) Radio program
( ) Online news source
( ) Political blog
( ) Comedic Programming
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Comedy Programs
12) About how often do you watch full episodes or clips from The Daily Show or The Colbert Report?
( ) Daily
( ) Several times per week
( ) Several times per month
( ) Rarely
( ) Never
13) About how often do you read an article or watch a video produced by The Onion?
( ) Daily
( ) Several times per week
( ) Several times per month
( ) Rarely
( ) Never

Political Participation
14) Do you consider yourself politically engaged?
( ) Very engaged
( ) Somewhat engaged
( ) Not engaged at all
( ) Not sure
15) How often do you participate in the following activities?

Discussing or debating
political matters with
family or friends
Discussing or debating
political matters in an
online forum
Reading books or indepth articles on
political figures or
political issues
Watching televised
political debates
Volunteering for
political campaigns
Participating in
political protests

Daily

Several times
per week

Several times
per month

Several times
per year

()

()

()

()

Less
than
once a
year
()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

16) How would you describe your political beliefs?
( ) Strongly conservative
( ) Moderately conservative
( ) Slightly conservative
( ) Independent
( ) Slightly liberal
( ) Moderately liberal
( ) Strongly liberal
( ) Not sure

Never
()
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Efficacy
17) How much confidence do you have in the groups of people running the following institutions to
competently perform their public roles?
A great deal of
Only some
Hardly any
Don't know
confidence
confidence
confidence
National Press
()
()
()
()
Local Press
()
()
()
()
Federal Executive
()
()
()
()
branch
Federal Legislative
()
()
()
()
branch
Local government
()
()
()
()
18) Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements:
Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

U.S. citizens are able to
influence national
public policy.

()

()

()

()

()

U.S. citizens are able to
influence local public
policy.

()

()

()

()

()

The political process is
controlled by elites.

()

()

()

()

()

Political discourse is
dominated by the mass
media.

()

()

()

()

()

My voice matters in the
political conversation.

()

()

()

()

()

19) How do you define "citizenship"?
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Citizenship
20) There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a good citizen. How important is it for a citizen to do
the following things?
Very important
Somewhat important
Not important at all
Always vote in elections
()
()
()
Stay informed on current
()
()
()
political and community
issues
Help people in the
()
()
()
community who have fewer
resources
Serve in the military
()
()
()
Always obey laws
()
()
()
Protect personal rights
()
()
()
Serve jury duty
()
()
()
Pay taxes
()
()
()

HIT completion code
21) Please create a five-digit code and enter it in the box below. Remember this code. You will be required to
enter the same five digits to complete the HIT.*
____________________________________________

Thank You!
Thank you for taking our survey. Your response is very important to us. Please return to mTurk and enter
your five-digit code in the text box.

117
APPENDIX B: STATISTICAL TABLES

Table 1. Models of Citizenship in Satirical Texts
Type of Citizenship
Liberal
Republican
Deliberative
Neutral
Media colonization

The Daily Show
(n=20)
0
4
0
7
9

The Colbert
Report (n=20)
5
5
0
5
5

The Onion
(n=20)
1
5
0
6
8

Total
(n=60)
6
14
0
18
22

Percentage of
Total
10.0%
23.3%
0.00%
30.0%
36.6%

Table 2. Campaign-Related Topics in Satirical Texts
Campaign-Related
Sub-topics
Presidential politics
Congressional politics
Televised debate
Media spectacle
Media partisanship
Campaign funding/spending
Negative campaigning
Rhetorical hypocrisy
Bribery/corruption
Conspiracy theories
Anti-intellectualism
Political partisanship

The Daily
Show (n=20)
18
1
9
7
9
2
3
5
0
0
3
7

The Colbert
Report (n=20)
15
2
2
8
8
1
0
2
2
6
4
2

The Onion
(n=20)
16
2
8
9
2
2
2
2
1
0
2
1

Total
(n=60)
49
5
19
24
19
5
5
9
3
6
9
10

Percentage
of Total
82.0%
8.3%
31.7%
40.0%
31.7%
8.3%
8.3%
15.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
16.7%

Table 3. Political Issues Topics in Satirical Texts
Political Issues
Sub-topics
Religion
Sexual morality
Domestic economy
Foreign Policy
Healthcare
Natural disaster aid

The Daily
Show (n=20)
2
1
5
5
0
0

The Colbert
Report (n=20)
1
2
2
1
0
2

The Onion
(n=20)
2
5
3
1
1
1

Total
(n=60)
5
8
9
7
1
3

Percentage of
Total
8.3%
13.3%
15.0%
11.7%
1.7%
5.0%
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Table 4. Citizenship and Voter Topics in Satirical Texts
Citizen and Voter
Sub-topics
Citizen Partisanship
Voter disenfranchisement
Voter rights
Voter responsibilities
Citizen voices
Public opinion
Voter demographics
Racial minorities

The Daily
Show (n=20)
5
0
0
3
4
3
2
1

The Colbert
Report (n=20)
4
2
4
1
1
3
5
1

The Onion
(n=20)
2
1
1
2
5
3
1
1

Total
(n=60)
11
3
5
6
10
9
8
3

Percentage of
Total
18.3%
5.0%
8.0%
10.0%
17.0%
15.0%
13.3.%
5.0%

Table 5. Satire Consumption and Efficacy on National Public Policy Crosstab

Disagree
U S citizens are able to
Neither Agree nor
influence national
Disagree
public policy
Agree

Total

Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption

Satire Consumption
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
28
36

Total

28.3%

33.0%

30.8%

19

28

47

19.2%

25.7%

22.6%

52

45

97

52.5%

41.3%

46.6%

99

109

208

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value
df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
2.754a
2 .252
Likelihood Ratio
2.761
2 .251
Linear-by-Linear Association
1.762
1 .184
N of Valid Cases
208
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 22.37.
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Table 6. Satire Consumption and Efficacy on Local Public Policy Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
8
23
31
Disagree
% within Satire
8.0%
21.3%
14.9%
Consumption
Count
17
23
40
U S citizens are able to
Neither Agree nor
influence local public
% within Satire
Disagree
17.0%
21.3%
19.2%
policy
Consumption
Count
75
62
137
Agree
% within Satire
75.0%
57.4%
65.9%
Consumption
Count
100
108
208
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
9.097
2
.011
Likelihood Ratio
9.403
2
.009
Linear-by-Linear Association
8.997
1
.003
N of Valid Cases
208
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.90.

Table 7. Satire Consumption and Political Conversation Crosstab

Disagree
My voice matters in the Neither Agree nor
political conversation Disagree
Agree

Total

Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption

Satire Consumption
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
38
49

Total

38.8%

45.8%

42.4%

22

33

55

22.4%

30.8%

26.8%

38

25

63

38.8%

23.4%

30.7%

98

107

205

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

87

Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
5.890
2
.053
Likelihood Ratio
5.916
2
.052
Linear-by-Linear Association
3.567
1
.059
N of Valid Cases
205
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 26.29.
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Table 8. Satire Consumption and Political Elites Crosstab

Disagree
The political process is Neither Agree nor
controlled by elites
Disagree
Agree

Total

Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption

Satire Consumption
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
13
6

Total

13.0%

5.6%

9.2%

21

20

41

21.0%

18.7%

19.8%

66

81

147

66.0%

75.7%

71.0%

100

107

207

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

19

Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
a
Pearson Chi-Square
3.902
2
Likelihood Ratio
3.962
2
Linear-by-Linear Association
3.582
1
N of Valid Cases
207
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.18.

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
.142
.138
.058

Table 9. Satire Consumption and Mediated Political Discourse Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
11
7
18
Disagree
% within Satire
11.1%
6.6%
8.8%
Consumption
Count
19
18
37
Political discourse is
Neither Agree nor
dominated by the mass
%
within
Satire
Disagree
19.2%
17.0%
18.0%
media
Consumption
Count
69
81
150
Agree
% within Satire
69.7%
76.4%
73.2%
Consumption
Count
99
106
205
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
1.639
2
.441
Likelihood Ratio
1.645
2
.439
Linear-by-Linear Association
1.585
1
.208
N of Valid Cases
205
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.69.
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Table 10. Satire Consumption and Presidential Vote Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
86
74

Total

Satire Consumption
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
73
58

Total

Count
160
% within Satire
86.9%
68.5%
77.3%
Consumption
Did you vote for the office
Count
12
33
45
of the United States
No
% within Satire
President in the 2012
12.1%
30.6%
21.7%
Consumption
election?
Count
1
1
2
Don’t know % within Satire
1.0%
0.9%
1.0%
Consumption
Count
99
108
207
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
10.328
2
.006
Likelihood Ratio
10.700
2
.005
Linear-by-Linear Association
.012
1
.915
N of Valid Cases
207
a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .96.
Yes

Table 11. Satire Consumption and Congressional Vote Crosstab

Count
% within Satire
73.7%
Consumption
Count
22
Did you vote for members
of United States Congress No
% within Satire
22.2%
in the 2012 election?
Consumption
Count
4
Don’t know % within Satire
4.0%
Consumption
Count
99
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
a
Pearson Chi-Square
8.946
2
Likelihood Ratio
9.066
2
Linear-by-Linear Association
.731
1
N of Valid Cases
207
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.26.
Yes

131

53.7%

63.3%

43

65

39.8%

31.4%

7

11

6.5%

5.3%

108

207

100.0%

100.0%

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
.011
.011
.393
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Table 12. Satire Consumption and Social Issues Vote Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
55
48

Count
% within Satire
55.0%
Consumption
Count
37
Did you vote on any social
issues on the ballot in the No
% within Satire
37.0%
2012 election?
Consumption
Count
8
Dont know % within Satire
8.0%
Consumption
Count
100
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
a
Pearson Chi-Square
2.938
2
Likelihood Ratio
2.948
2
Linear-by-Linear Association
.019
1
N of Valid Cases
209
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.66.
Yes

Total

103

44.0%

49.3%

53

90

48.6%

43.1%

8

16

7.3%

7.7%

109

209

100.0%

100.0%

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
.230
.229
.889

Table 13. Satire Consumption and Confidence in National Press Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
10
6
16
A great deal of
%
within
Satire
National Press: How
confidence
10.3%
5.8%
8.0%
Consumption
much confidence do you
Count
56
56
112
have in the groups of
people running the
Only some confidence % within Satire
57.7%
53.8%
55.7%
following institutions to
Consumption
competently perform
Count
31
42
73
their public roles?
Hardly any confidence % within Satire
32.0%
40.4%
36.3%
Consumption
Count
97
104
201
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
2.417
2
.299
Likelihood Ratio
2.431
2
.297
Linear-by-Linear Association
2.317
1
.128
N of Valid Cases
201
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.72.
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Table 14. Satire Consumption and Confidence in Local Press Crosstab

A great deal of
Local Press: How much confidence
confidence do you have
in the groups of people
running the following Only some confidence
institutions to
competently perform
their public roles?
Hardly any confidence

Total

Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption

Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
12
13
25
12.4%

12.4%

12.4%

64

54

118

66.0%

51.4%

58.4%

21

38

59

21.6%

36.2%

29.2%

97

105

202

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
5.478a
2
.065
Likelihood Ratio
5.540
2
.063
Linear-by-Linear Association
2.734
1
.098
N of Valid Cases
202
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.00.

Table 15. Satire Consumption and Confidence in Federal Executive Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
20
13
33
A great deal of
Federal Executive
%
within
Satire
confidence
21.3%
12.6%
16.8%
branch: How much
Consumption
confidence do you have
Count
45
46
91
in the groups of people
Only some confidence % within Satire
running the following
47.9%
44.7%
46.2%
Consumption
institutions to
Count
29
44
73
competently perform
Hardly
any
confidence
% within Satire
their public roles?
30.9%
42.7%
37.1%
Consumption
Count
94
103
197
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
4.176
2
.124
Likelihood Ratio
4.200
2
.122
Linear-by-Linear Association
4.145
1
.042
N of Valid Cases
197
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.75.
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Table 16. Satire Consumption and Confidence in Federal Legislature Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
9
6
15
A great deal of
Federal Legislative
%
within
Satire
confidence
9.4%
5.8%
7.5%
branch: How much
Consumption
confidence do you have
Count
38
41
79
in the groups of people
Only some confidence % within Satire
running the following
39.6%
39.8%
39.7%
Consumption
institutions to
Count
49
56
105
competently perform
Hardly any confidence % within Satire
their public roles?
51.0%
54.4%
52.8%
Consumption
Count
96
103
199
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
.936a
2
.626
Likelihood Ratio
.939
2
.625
Linear-by-Linear Association
.587
1
.444
N of Valid Cases
199
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.24.

Table 17. Satire Consumption and Confidence in Local Government Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
12
11
A great deal of
%
within
Satire
Local government: How confidence
12.4%
10.5%
Consumption
much confidence do you
Count
56
51
have in the groups of
people running the
Only some confidence % within Satire
57.7%
48.6%
following institutions to
Consumption
competently perform
Count
29
43
their public roles?
Hardly any confidence % within Satire
29.9%
41.0%
Consumption
Count
97
105
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
2.687
2
.261
Likelihood Ratio
2.700
2
.259
Linear-by-Linear Association
2.045
1
.153
N of Valid Cases
202
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.04.

Total

23
11.4%
107
53.0%
72
35.6%
202
100.0%
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Table 18. Frequency distribution of Habermasian model of citizenship
Frequency
Percent Valid Percent
Liberal
107
51.0
54.9
Republican
49
23.3
25.1
Valid
Both Liberal & Republican
39
18.6
20.0
Total
195
92.9
100.0
Missing System
15
7.1
Total
210
100.0

Cumulative Percent
54.9
80.0
100.0

Table 19. Regression on Predictors of Liberal Citizenship
Model Summary
Model
R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of the Estimate
a
1
.302
.091
.061
.48419
a. Predictors: (Constant), How would you describe your political beliefs?, What is your race? White/Other, What is
the highest level of education you have completed?, What is your gender?, What is your age?, About how often do
you watch full episodes or clips from The Daily Show or The Colbert Report?
Coefficientsa
Model

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
597.059

(Constant)
About how often do you
watch full episodes or clips
-.116
from The Daily Show or The
Colbert Report?
What is your age?
.093
What is your gender?
-.011
1
What is your race?
.146
White/Other
What is the highest level of
education you have
.015
completed?
How would you describe your
-.040
political beliefs?
a. Dependent Variable: LiberalCitizenship

Std. Error
822.265

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.

.726

.469

.033

-.268

-3.489

.001

.040
.075

.175
-.011

2.302
-.146

.022
.884

.102

.107

1.435

.153

.025

.042

.587

.558

.021

-.141

-1.865

.064
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Table 20. Regression on Predictors of Republican Citizenship
Model Summary
Model
R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of the Estimate
1
.201a
.040
.009
.43455
a. Predictors: (Constant), How would you describe your political beliefs?, What is your race? White/Other, What is
the highest level of education you have completed?, What is your gender?, What is your age?, About how often do
you watch full episodes or clips from The Daily Show or The Colbert Report?
Coefficientsa
Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

B
(Constant)
340.665
About how often do you
watch full episodes or clips
.038
from The Daily Show or The
Colbert Report?
What is your age?
-.083
What is your gender?
.004
1
What is your race?
-.065
White/Other
What is the highest level of
education you have
-.012
completed?
How would you describe your
.019
political beliefs?
a. Dependent Variable: RepublicanCitizenship

Std. Error
737.959

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.

.462

.645

.030

.101

1.274

.204

.036
.068

-.180
.005

-2.303
.061

.022
.951

.091

-.055

-.714

.476

.022

-.041

-.550

.583

.019

.079

1.017

.310

Table 21. Habermasian Model of Citizenship by Satire Consumption Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
41
65
106
Liberal
% within Satire
44.1%
64.4%
54.6%
Consumption
Count
27
22
49
Habermasian model of
Republican
% within Satire
citizenship
29.0%
21.8%
25.3%
Consumption
Count
25
14
39
Both Liberal &
%
within
Satire
Republican
26.9%
13.9%
20.1%
Consumption
Count
93
101
194
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
8.732a
2
.013
Likelihood Ratio
8.808
2
.012
Linear-by-Linear Association
7.769
1
.005
N of Valid Cases
194
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Table 22. Habermasian Model of Citizenship by Satire Consumption, Controlling for Political Affiliation (3
parties) Crosstab
Political Affiliation (3 parties)
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
3
14
17
Liberal
% within Satire
21.4%
50.0%
40.5%
Consumption
Count
7
8
15
Habermasian
model of
Republican
% within Satire
50.0%
28.6%
35.7%
citizenship
Consumption
Conservative
Count
4
6
10
Both Liberal &
%
within
Satire
Republican
28.6%
21.4%
23.8%
Consumption
Count
14
28
42
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Count
7
17
24
Liberal
% within Satire
53.8%
73.9%
66.7%
Consumption
Habermasian
Count
3
1
4
model of
Republican
% within Satire
23.1%
4.3%
11.1%
citizenship
Consumption
Independent
Count
3
5
8
Both Liberal &
% within Satire
Republican
23.1%
21.7%
22.2%
Consumption
Count
13
23
36
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Count
31
33
64
Liberal
% within Satire
47.7%
68.8%
56.6%
Consumption
Habermasian
Count
16
13
29
model of
Republican
% within Satire
24.6%
27.1%
25.7%
citizenship
Consumption
Liberal
Count
18
2
20
Both Liberal &
% within Satire
Republican
27.7%
4.2%
17.7%
Consumption
Count
65
48
113
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Count
41
64
105
Liberal
% within Satire
44.6%
64.6%
55.0%
Consumption
Count
26
22
48
Habermasian
model of
Republican
% within Satire
28.3%
22.2%
25.1%
citizenship
Consumption
Total
Count
25
13
38
Both Liberal &
%
within
Satire
Republican
27.2%
13.1%
19.9%
Consumption
Count
92
99
191
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
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(Table 23 Continued) Chi-Square Tests
Political Affiliation (3 parties)
Value
df
b
Pearson Chi-Square
3.282
2
Likelihood Ratio
3.435
2
Conservative
Linear-by-Linear Association
1.238
1
N of Valid Cases
42
Pearson Chi-Square
3.130c
2
Likelihood Ratio
3.034
2
Independent
Linear-by-Linear Association
.277
1
N of Valid Cases
36
Pearson Chi-Square
10.861d
2
Likelihood Ratio
12.529
2
Liberal
Linear-by-Linear Association
10.327
1
N of Valid Cases
113
Pearson Chi-Square
8.916a
2
Likelihood Ratio
9.011
2
Total
Linear-by-Linear Association
8.322
1
N of Valid Cases
191
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.30.
b. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.33.
c. 3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.44.
d. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.50.

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
.194
.179
.266
.209
.219
.598
.004
.002
.001
.012
.011
.004

Table 23. Satire Consumption and Importance of Voting Crosstab

Always vote in elections: Very important
There are different
opinions as to what it
takes to be a good citizen Somewhat important
How important is it for a
citizen to do the
following things?
Not important at all

Total

Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption

Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
69
49
118
69.0%

45.0%

56.5%

26

43

69

26.0%

39.4%

33.0%

5

17

22

5.0%

15.6%

10.5%

100

109

209

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square
13.762a
2
.001
Likelihood Ratio
14.167
2
.001
Linear-by-Linear Association
13.574
1
.000
N of Valid Cases
209
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.53.
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Table 24. Satire Consumption and Importance of Staying Informed Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
60
50
110
Stay informed on current Very important
% within Satire
61.2%
45.9%
53.1%
political and community
Consumption
issues: There are different
Count
38
47
85
opinions as to what it
Somewhat important % within Satire
takes to be a good citizen
38.8%
43.1%
41.1%
Consumption
How important is it for a
Count
0
12
12
citizen to do the
Not
important
at
all
%
within
Satire
following things?
0.0%
11.0%
5.8%
Consumption
Count
98
109
207
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
13.315
2
.001
Likelihood Ratio
17.916
2
.000
Linear-by-Linear Association
9.772
1
.002
N of Valid Cases
207
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.68.

Table 25. Satire Consumption and Importance of Charity Crosstab

Help people in the
Very important
community who have
fewer resources: There
are different opinions as
to what it takes to be a Somewhat important
good citizen. How
important is it for a
citizen to do the
Not important at all
following things?
Total

Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption
Count
% within Satire
Consumption

Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
61
42
103
61.6%

38.5%

49.5%

36

52

88

36.4%

47.7%

42.3%

2

15

17

2.0%

13.8%

8.2%

99

109

208

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
15.911
2
.000
Likelihood Ratio
17.221
2
.000
Linear-by-Linear Association
15.424
1
.000
N of Valid Cases
208
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.09.
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Table 26. Satire Consumption and Importance of Military Service Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
11
8
19
Very
important
%
within
Satire
Serve in the military:
11.1%
7.5%
9.3%
Consumption
There are different
Count
40
49
89
opinions as to what it
takes to be a good citizen. Somewhat important % within Satire
40.4%
46.2%
43.4%
How important is it for a
Consumption
citizen to do the
Count
48
49
97
following things?
Not important at all % within Satire
48.5%
46.2%
47.3%
Consumption
Count
99
106
205
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
1.156
2
.561
Likelihood Ratio
1.159
2
.560
Linear-by-Linear Association
.021
1
.886
N of Valid Cases
205
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.18.

Table 27. Satire Consumption and Importance of Obeying Laws Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
44
62
106
Very
important
%
within
Satire
Always obey laws: There
45.8%
56.9%
51.7%
Consumption
are different opinions as
Count
49
42
91
to what it takes to be a
good citizen. How
Somewhat important % within Satire
51.0%
38.5%
44.4%
important is it for a
Consumption
citizen to do the
Count
3
5
8
following things?
Not important at all % within Satire
3.1%
4.6%
3.9%
Consumption
Count
96
109
205
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
3.284
2
.194
Likelihood Ratio
3.291
2
.193
Linear-by-Linear Association
1.425
1
.233
N of Valid Cases
205
a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.75.
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Table 28. Satire Consumption and Importance of Protecting Personal Rights Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
75
79
154
Very
important
%
within
Satire
Protect personal rights:
75.0%
73.8%
74.4%
Consumption
There are different
Count
23
25
48
opinions as to what it
takes to be a good citizen. Somewhat important % within Satire
23.0%
23.4%
23.2%
How important is it for a
Consumption
citizen to do the
Count
2
3
5
following things?
Not important at all % within Satire
2.0%
2.8%
2.4%
Consumption
Count
100
107
207
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
.151
2
.927
Likelihood Ratio
.152
2
.927
Linear-by-Linear Association
.080
1
.777
N of Valid Cases
207
a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.42.

Table 29. Satire Consumption and Importance of Serving Jury Duty Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
43
37
80
Very
important
%
within
Satire
Serve jury duty: There
43.0%
33.9%
38.3%
Consumption
are different opinions as
Count
41
48
89
to what it takes to be a
good citizen. How
Somewhat important % within Satire
41.0%
44.0%
42.6%
important is it for a
Consumption
citizen to do the
Count
16
24
40
following things?
Not important at all % within Satire
16.0%
22.0%
19.1%
Consumption
Count
100
109
209
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
2.217
2
.330
Likelihood Ratio
2.225
2
.329
Linear-by-Linear Association
2.194
1
.139
N of Valid Cases
209
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 19.14.
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Table 30. Satire Consumption and Importance of Paying Taxes Crosstab
Satire Consumption
Total
Regular
Little to No
Consumption Consumption
Count
76
62
138
Very important
% within Satire
76.0%
56.9%
66.0%
Pay taxes: There are
Consumption
different opinions as to
Count
23
36
59
what it takes to be a good
Somewhat important % within Satire
citizen. How important is
23.0%
33.0%
28.2%
Consumption
it for a citizen to do the
Count
1
11
12
following things?
Not important at all % within Satire
1.0%
10.1%
5.7%
Consumption
Count
100
109
209
Total
% within Satire
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Consumption
Chi-Square Tests
Value
df
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
a
Pearson Chi-Square
12.253
2
.002
Likelihood Ratio
13.675
2
.001
Linear-by-Linear Association
11.661
1
.001
N of Valid Cases
209
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.74.
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